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In 1880, a group of Ottoman tribes attacked land held by Persia. As a result, the whole 
area to the west of Lake Urumiye was affected. The extent of the attacks reached even the 
city of Tabriz. The leading figure in this movement was an Ottoman Naqshebandi Sheikh 
named Ubeydullah. His movement is considered to be the first Kurdish uprising that had 
national aspirations. The stance of the Ottoman Empire towards this movement had 
various considerations that shall be evaluated in the context of the depressed time, an era 
in which pressures toward the empire’s dissolution were keenly felt. The aim of the 
present study is to understand the nature of the sheikh’s movement and how it was 
shaped by international conditions, especially the Ottoman involvement in it. 
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1880 yılında bir takım Osmanlı aşiretleri İran topraklarına saldırdılar. Sonuç olarak 
Urmiye Gölünün batısındaki tüm topraklar etkilendi. Saldıraların tesiri Tebriz şehrine 
bile uzadı. Şeyh Ubeydullah adındaki Osmanlı nakşibendi şeyhi, bu hareketin başını 
çekiyordu. Hareketi milliyetçi istekleri olan ilk Kürt ayaklanması olarak değerlendirildi. 
Osmanlı imparatorluğunun bu harekete karşı tavrını, içinde bulunduğu kötü zamanlarına 
göre değerlendirilenecek türlü fikirler oluşturdu. Uzun zamandan beri imparatorluk 
üzerinde çözülme etkiliydi. Bu çalışmanin amacı, şeyhin hareketinin yapısını, uluslararası 
şartların bu hareketi nasıl şekillendirdiğini ve özellikle de bu harekette Osmanlının rolünü 
incelemektir. 
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This study tries to analyze the Sheikh Ubeydullah movement of 1880. As a Naqshebandi-
Halidi sheikh with an important position in the order, his movement seemed to be instigated 
by the religious differences between the Ottoman and Persian Empires. Until this time, both 
states had been trying to settle their borders and unfortunately the sheikh had some estates that 
straddled both sides. The recent increasing interest in the Kurdish problem made his 
movement the most cited example of the first Kurdish arising with national aspirations. Thus 
the most-quoted letter of Sheikh Ubeydullah to William Abbot, the British consul-general in 
Tabriz, delivered by Dr. Cochran: “The Kurdish nation, consisting of more than 500,000 
families, is a people apart. Their religion is different [from that of others], and their laws and 
customs are distinct …... The Chiefs and Rulers of Kurdistan, whether Turkish or Persian 
subjects, and the inhabitants of Kurdistan, one and all are united and agreed that matters 
cannot be carried on in this way with the two Governments [Ottoman and Qajar], and that 
necessarily something must be done, so that European Governments having understood the 
matter, shall inquire into our state. We also are a nation apart. We want our affairs to be in our 
own hands….”1 These words were also shocking for the Ottoman central government. In fact, 
the Ottoman government spent considerable time trying to establish the authenticity of the 
letter. The state did not find evidence of his conspiracy based on the letter, but when it began 
to believe that the sheikh would not use his influence in favor of the Ottoman government, he 
was exiled.  
His movement did not seem to have a political agenda. As a movement, which 
suddenly appeared in the midst of such a sensitive period, it received great attention. The 
Armenian issue after the Treaty of Berlin brought the allegation that the sultan had tried to 
create a Kurdish problem in order to curtail “reforms” for the Ottoman Empire’s Christian 
                                                 
1John Joseph, The Nestorians and Their Muslim Neighbors, pp. 109-10. 
 3 
subjects. The nationalism of the sheikh should be reconsidered in light of this. Although the 
sheikh always insisted that he had his own land problem with the Persian Empire, he was not 
reluctant to pursue other problems on behalf of the Kurds. His opponents charged that he had 
other intentions beside the return of his estates. However, to date no Ottoman documents have 
been examined towards clearing up this issue. The present study will try to address this gap. 
Another point that makes this study crucial is that establishing Hamidian regiments 
became a political decision after his movement; therefore one cannot comprehend them 
without first examining his movement. Initially, the study will focus on the roots of the 
sheikh’s influence. His role in the 1877-78 Ottoman and Russian war has been neglected. The 
disaster of this great defeat makes this neglect even more glaring and lamentable. The 
international conditions that levered his carrier will be described in the following chapter. 
Next comes an attempt to explain the sheikh’s charisma in the tribal context. Finally, the 
anatomy of his movement, covered in the final two chapters, will be examined to show what 












Chapter 1  
Sheikh Ubeydullah’s Role in the 1877-1878 Ottoman-Russian War  
At the beginning of 1877, political problems in the Balkan region caused the Ottoman 
Empire’s involvement in military conflict with Russia. The empire was constantly pressed for 
what the Europeans called “reforms” for its Christian subjects, with much of the unrest in the 
Balkan provinces supported and encouraged by Russia. Under the guise of such “reforms,” 
Russia was pursuing its pan-Slavic interests, hoping that the situation would give it a suitable 
opportunity to secure revenge for the Crimean War in both the Balkans and Transcaucasia, 
where it was using Christian ambitions for conquest to its own advantage. The policies of 
Czarist imperialism had altered the demographic ratios of the entire east and left local 
populations to be decimated by local hatreds. According to Richard Hovannisian, a historian 
of Armenian nationalist movements, “In 1838, after the influx of immigrants from Persia and 
Turkey, the Armenians constituted one-half of the province’s (i.e. Armenian oblast in the 
Russian Caucasus) 165,000 inhabitants. Moreover, in the remainder of Transcaucasia lived 
more than 200,000 Armenians, some of whom, moving subsequently to Yerevan-
Nakhichevan, contributed to the reestablishment of a Christian majority in the province.” 2 
The creation of an Armenian majority in the area left the Muslims as a persecuted minority, 
forcing the latter to flee to Azerbaijan and elsewhere. These demographic changes generally 
came after the wars, often through forced immigration. Once the population balance turned 
against them, the remaining depressed minorities simply resorted to flight due to lack of 
confidence in the central authority. 
The growing tensions among the populace of Transcaucasia found a natural base 
among the mutual hatreds of local people. During the 1877 campaigns and before, the use of 
                                                 
2Hovannisian, Armenia on the Road to Independence, p. 10. 
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local Christians on the Russian side was a significant policy for creating a Czarist hegemony 
and influence over them. Such a policy exacerbated the existing tensions. 
The representatives of European states attended the conference of the powers held on 
December 23, 1876 at the Ottoman naval headquarters at the Tersane (Naval Shipyard) on the 
Golden Horn in Istanbul. The meeting was called because of the Ottoman refusal to accept the 
dictates of the powers following the Ottoman military movement toward Serbia and 
Montenegro at the end of October, which would have transformed the Ottoman victory into a 
diplomatic defeat. On the same day the gathering convened, the sultan proclaimed a new 
constitution establishing a constitutional monarchy for the empire and concluding that the 
“reforms” demanded by the powers were no longer necessary. 
Although the Constitution of 1876 was put into force, there was no time to elect 
representatives to the provisional assembly, a body that would have the final authority to 
decide on the alternate proposals made by the Tersane Conference. A temporary General 
Assembly was called, therefore, to make a decision on behalf of the Ottoman Empire. It met 
on January 18, 1877, with 180 Muslim and 60 non-Muslim members and decided to resist the 
proposals and instead protest the Russian demands by declaring war. In the meantime, the 
Tersane Conference was suspended following proclamation of the Ottoman Constitution. 
Soon afterwards it met again in London, producing what came to be known as the London 
Protocol, which, however, also was rejected by the Ottoman General Assembly. Unable to 
secure its ends by diplomatic means, Russia responded by invading Ottoman territory on 
April 24, 1877, thus starting the Ottoman-Russian war. 
The war went forward on two fronts, first the Balkans, and second in the east in the 
province of Erzurum, one of the Ottoman Empire’s largest, including the cities of Van, Muş, 
Erzincan, Bayezid, Kars and Oltu. The Russian Army selected Erzurum and Van as its main 
objectives, to be followed if possible by Ardahan, Kars and Beyazid. The province of 
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Erzurum was the headquarters of the Fourth Army and had to be defended if the Russians 
were to be prevented from occupying all of eastern Anatolia. The battles fought in this area 
between the Russian invaders and Ottoman defenders devastated the land and aroused its 
Christian minorities to rise up against their Muslim neighbors, and were, therefore, the main 
cause of the political, economic and social problems that affected the area for years after the 
war itself came to an end. 
In fact the Ottomans were unprepared both financially and logistically for the war. The 
empire had been borrowing at very high interest rates since the start of the Crimean War in 
1854 and was close to bankruptcy. Russia had far more foot soldiers and horsemen than did 
the Ottomans. The roads in the area were entirely inadequate to move soldiers, cannons, 
equipment, food and other materiel to the eastern Anatolian fronts. The Ottoman Army 
therefore had to rely mainly on irregular infantry and cavalrymen, who habitually refused to 
obey their officers and went home as soon as their desire for booty from friend and foe alike 
was satisfied. Furthermore, the regions in which most battles took place were comprised 
mainly of mountainous terrain, and involved very long winters and springs, which further 
hindered the Ottoman Army’s maneuvers. Support from nearby citizens and especially the 
promises of notables therefore became critical.  
The administrative weakness of the empire further hindered Ottoman military efforts. 
While the Ottoman government had been trying to eliminate the tax farming system, with its 
attendant abuses, since the early years of the Tanzimat reform movement, it had not yet been 
replaced in the eastern provinces in particular, despite Abdulhamid II’s serious efforts to 
establish direct collection of taxes in order to create a strong, efficient bureaucracy. Many 
civilian offices were still linked directly to military positions. Most appointments to positions 
in both the bureaucracy and army were achieved by means other than merit, inevitably leading 
to considerable abuse of the subjects of the sultan, who therefore were far from willing to 
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assist the empire’s war effort. Just as the taxes were farmed to those who placed the highest 
bid, most administrative offices were given to those who provided the greatest expectations in 
return. Before the Russian onslaught, thus, most positions of civil government had been given 
to those who promised to conscript the most soldiers in return. For example Muhtar Paşa 
mentions that Erzurum Governor Kurt Ismail Paşa had promised to provide 32 regiments of 
conscripts of Kurds and others living in his area.3 
Mehmet Arif tells of regular Major (nizamiye askeriye miralayı) Ahmed Bey, who was 
assigned to organize the irregular cavalries at the Eleşgirt but failed to appear for this task and 
was not called to account,4 who might be one of the Bedirhani’s sons.5  
There were many administrative abuses. For example, Ahmed Muhtar Paşa tells in his 
memoirs of how when he was appointed commander of the Fourth Army and governor of 
Erzurum, he arrested 13 Kurds with the help of Nafiz Paşa, the governor of Muş. He wanted 
to exile them for attacking and torturing local Christians, but they were not found guilty 
because the victims were afraid to testify against them.  
Taxes were collected arbitrarily and subject to the abuse of collectors. Ahmed Muhtar 
Paşa tells of the collecting of tithes in Kars. Strategically, he insisted that taxes for the year 
1875 be collected in kind rather than in cash and that the collected tithes be stored in the 
citadel of Kars. Some of the taxes had been collected in kind until the Russian Consul 
Ignatiev gave a guarantee. Moreover, the need for cash forced the Ottoman government to 
accept taxes as payment in cash. Later when Muhtar Paşa was appointed the general 
commander of Bosnia and Herzegovina, these collected grains were sold to the Russians with 
the permission of Sami Paşa, who had replaced him.6  
                                                 
3 Gazi Muhtar Paşa, Anadoluda Rus Muharebeleri, p. 25. 
4 Mehmed Arif, Başımıza Gelenler, p. 396.  
5 Malmisanıj, Cizre Botanlı Bedirhaniler, p. 99. 
6 Gazi Muhtar Paşa, Sergüzeşt-i Hayatımın Cild-i Evveli, p. 105. During the Balkan crisis, Muhtar Paşa 
appointed as general commander of Bosnia and Herzegovina on December 5, 1875 therefore he left the Erzurum 
for a while. When Muhtar Paşa returned back to his position as the commander of Anatolian General Army, 
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Anatolian Army commander Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa was informed by General Kurt 
Ismail Paşa, the governor of Erzurum, that he had brought together 32 rows of soldiers from 
the provinces of Erzurum and Hakkari, and that in addition local religious leader Sheikh 
Ubeydullah would come with 50,000 horsemen, and that Circassian Colonel Musa Paşa 
would bring four regiments of horsemen conscripted from refugees and immigrants from the 
Russian Caucasus who had gathered in the area of the Samsun province. The chief of Staff 
told Ahmed Muhtar Paşa that 100 rows had been assigned to the Fourth Army, but Muhtar 
found that in fact there were only 57,560 soldiers, most of whom were not sufficiently trained 
to be effective fighters against the organized Russian Army. Muhtar further found that the 
supply services in the area were almost nonexistent and concluded that he would have to 
defend a frontier of more than 300 kilometers with no more than 48,000 soldiers.7 
Sheikh Ubeydullah was leading a group of auxiliaries in this war. Various authors give 
different figures for their strength. For example, Garo Sasuni says that the Kurds entered the 
1877 war with Russia in support of the Ottomans under the command of Sheikh Celalettin,8 
Sheikh Ubeydullah and Sheikh Ubeydullah’s young son Sheikh Abdulkadir, who altogether 
brought 50,000 soldiers centered at Beyazid. Garo Sasuni reports that during the Crimean War 
as well as the Ottoman-Russian War of 1828, the Kurds had openly allied with the Russians 
against the Ottomans in the hope of securing independence. He adds that the new governor of 
Van under Sultan Abdlhamid II poisoned Sheikh Celalettin on the orders of the sultan, while 
                                                                                                                                                        
Sami Paşa was moved to Greece. Sami Paşa would later get a leading role as the commander of Fourth Army in 
establishing order during the Sheikh Ubeydullah movement. 
7 Gazi Muhtar Paşa, Anadoluda Rus Muharebeleri, p. 24 and Dr. Rıfat Uçarol, Gazi Ahmet Muhtar Paşa, p. 72. 
The information about the 1877-78 Ottoman-Russian War is taken from memoirs written after the war, 
especially those of Gazi Muhtar Paşa and Mehmet Arif. Muhtar Paşa, former commander of the Fourth Army, 
initially published his memoirs under the title “Sergüzeşt-i Hayatımın Cild-i Evveli,” wherein he gave a general 
account of his life. Later he published “Anadolu’da Rus Muharebesi 1876-1877” as a history of the Anatolian 
War. The authors of both memoirs tried to refute accusations concerning the great defeat. Some commanders 
were sentenced for their errors after the war. The defeat had been good reason to blame the opposite faction 
among various cliques in the army. Their data about the general numbers of the army seems accurate because 
both of them held official positions and could provide documentation. Yet they both had a negative attitude 
towards the “irregulars.” Both Arif and Muhtar’s memoirs have subjective aspects, since after the war everyone 
looked for a scapegoat on which to lay blame. 
8 Sufficient information about Sheikh Cemalettin is lacking. He might be another Naqshebandi sheikh from the 
Erzincan province. 
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Sheikh Ubeydullah was sent on pilgrimage to Mecca after his defeat by the Russians at 
Beyazid.9 
Muzaffer Ilhan Erdost states that Seyid Islam Geylani, in a personal interview, claimed 
that with Sheikh Ubeydullah he joined the Ottoman Army in the war with Russia with 40,000 
irregular horsemen recruited from Diyarbakır, Rızaiye (Urmiye), Sulaimaniyah and Van.10 In 
his petition to the sultan, Sheikh Ubeydullah said that he had collected at least 40,000 cavalry 
and auxiliary soldiers and entered the war without any provisions or payment for seven 
months.11 
Gazi Muhtar Paşa’s memoirs do not give any detailed information on the contribution 
of irregular soldiers to the Ottoman Army during the war with Russia. He does mention that 
one of the leading Ottoman generals, Ismail Hakki Bey, and others were only able to collect a 
force of 15,000 soldiers 10 days after the war began, but that when the enemy attacked 
Ardahan, all of these troops fled.12 Avreyanov, on the other hand, writes that İsmail Hakkı 
was the most industrious of the local commanders, a man who tried to influence the Kurds in 
favor of supporting the Ottoman army, but maintained his power through harsh and cruel 
methods. Ismail Hakkı was firmly devoted to the sultan and showed little mercy when dealing 
with Kurds. He was famous among them because he himself was a Kurd from Kars and 
former governor of Diyarbakır. His fame spread as a result of his success in suppressing local 
uprisings in the Egil, Ahcankent, Bohtan and Cezire areas. Arif claims that Ismail Paşa’s 
family had substantial influence among the Karapapaks due to his father’s stay in the district 
of Şüregel, thus claiming that he was not of Kurdish origin.13 
 Such methods seem to have caused the Kurds not to respond to Sami Paşa’s December 
1876 call for men from the provinces of Van, Bitlis and Muş. The tribes felt they were 
                                                 
9 Garo Sasuni, 15 yy.da Günümüze Kürt Ermeni Ilişkileri, p. 150. 
10 Muzaffer İlhan Erdost, Şemdinli Röportajı, p. 40. 
11 Y. PRK. AZJ.... 4/96 12 October 1881. 
12 Gazi Muhtar Paşa, Anadoluda Rus Muharebeleri, p. 49 
13 Mehmed Arif, Başımıza Gelenler, p. 171. 
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exempted from military services so that not even previously trained soldiers were willing to 
report, nor did they even respond to calls for enrollment of irregular auxiliaries.14 Sultan 
Abdülhamit II therefore felt that appealing to the hearts of true believers was a better choice 
than ordering his oppressive commanders to conscript soldiers from among depressed and 
unwilling tribesmen. 
Averyarov mentions Abdulhamid’s declaration of holy war under the green flag of the 
Prophet, and considers it to have been effective to a certain extent, even though the Kurds felt 
the sultan was not a real caliph because he lacked direct descent from the Prophet, while most 
Kurdish sheiks claimed such descent. The Kurds of Botan, in fact, claimed to be descendants 
of the Abbasid Dynasty, and consequently used the Abbasid flag during their rebellions 
against the Ottomans. Avreyarov thus claimed that Sheikh Ubeydullah, leader of the small 
Oramar tribe of Hakkari, was a descendant of the Prophet’s nephew, Hazret-i Khaled.15  
According to Avreyarov, Sheikh Ubeydullah felt he was defending Islam rather than 
the Caliphate, and entered the war with 300 followers (murid) from his tekke. Avreyarov felt 
it was far more effective to call Kurds to battle in defense of Islam as such rather than the 
caliphate. In general the call was effective even though the tribes remained reluctant to 
contribute men to the Ottoman Army. The Kurds considered the military contribution a good 
opportunity for a probable general amnesty.16 The constant military actions for implementing 
central policies and administrative reorganizations wore away at local privileges. Their way of 
implementation, as seen in the memoirs, were at the root of the regional disobedience of the 
call to arms. Since the tribes were most affected by the process, they replied to the 1877 call 
by remembering the military exemption which they enjoyed in the old times.  
Gazi Ahmet Muhtar Paşa tells of a telegram sent to him from Chief of Staff Mustafa 
Paşa, who pointed to the need to support the Anatolian Army in order to prevent Russian 
                                                 
14 Averyarov 19. Asırda Rusya, Türkiye Iran Muharebeleri p. 89. 
15iibid. pp. 89-90 Consequently Averyarov also mentions Russian’s resort to the Kurdish auxiliaries. 
16ibid. p. 91.  
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invasion after the Alacadağ defeat. Therefore Sheikh Ubeydullah, whose appeal spanned from 
Süleymaniye to Bayezid, was appealed to for help. He was asked to provide and send at least 
6,000 auxiliary cavalries to a place specified by Muhtar Paşa. Mustafa Paşa ordered Muhtar 
Paşa to reward the sheikh and declare these orders with a suitable tone. He further demanded 
that the conscripted and arriving armies should be treated kindly. In reply to the telegram, 
Muhtar Paşa said that these auxiliary troops had arrived without any provisions, which made 
the situation worse. Therefore, he requested necessary provisions from the center. Muhtar 
Paşa comments in his memoirs that he did not mention specifically Sheikh Ubeydullah in the 
telegram dated November 24 ,17 because before that, many messages were also taken and the 
necessary replies given. In one of them he related that the followers of the sheikh had loved 
him more while he was sitting in his lodge (tekke). “From the beginning of the conflict, the 
sheikh informed Istanbul via the governor about his promise to join them with a 50,000-strong 
cavalry. However he came to serve with only around 1,500, which observably caused harm 
rather than good. Later, citing as a pretext the disrespect shown him and the little care given 
his soldiers, the sheikh departed. When he realized his importance as stressed in the 
telegrams, the sheikh began to declare his intention to join the Persian side, since revenues 
from many villages and counties were his due as a privilege (arpalık) by the Iranian departed. 
He wrote to the Van governor that he must be told whether it was demanded of him that he 
refrain from this act [i.e., crossing to the Persian side, so that he could enjoy the benefits 
involved].”18  
Averyarov gives details about the sheikh’s role in the 1877-78 war. He describes the 
secondary role given to Kurdish auxiliaries conscripted in Van so as to block Russia’s 
Yerevan forces in case they attacked. These auxiliaries were under the command of Faik Paşa. 
The notables of these forces were Sheikh Abdullah (Siirt), Sheikh Hamza (Siirt), Muslih 
                                                 
17 Gazi Muhtar Paşa gives the date according to the old calendar in Anadoluda Rus Muharebeleri, p. 141. 
18 Ibid, p. 142.  
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Efendi (Erzincan) and Mehmet Efendi (Bitlis) and other Kurdish chiefs. The most important 
role belonged to Sheikh Ubeydullah Efendi. Whether the Kurds would help truly help the 
Ottoman government very soon become unclear: “In January 1877, the sheikh moved to the 
province of Van. Although he began to conscript all the Kurds in the Van district, when Faik 
Paşa came to Van two-and-half months later – that is, on April 9 – he could find no Kurdish 
horsemen. Even though Faik Paşa tried to get take precautionary measures by sending his 
officers and sergeants to bring the auxiliaries, the formation of forces at Van became very 
loose and unsuccessful. During the war, forces under the command of Faik Paşa only 
approached 11,000-12,000 men. Other than sergeants and officers under cadre, most of Faik 
Paşa’s forces consisted of Kurds. Therefore Faik Paşa could not rely on regular Ottoman units 
and had to be satisfied with these auxiliaries.”19 
Avreyarov attributed this failure to the inability of establishing and supplying a war 
center at Van on time and making necessary provisions and payments to Kurdish militias. 
“Each cavalry promised to be given 300 piastre (18 Russian ruble), which they could not get. 
Faik Paşa was lazy and not able to use stick policy as good as Ismail Hakkı Paşa. This fact, in 
turn, promoted the negative and rebellious behaviors of Kurds. The most important reason of 
all was that; Kurds were reluctant to enter the war before it began, since they would not be 
able to seizure and pillage in that case. Their army center was far away from the Russian 
frontier leaving them a little time for pillaging, because they had to carry the goods to their 
homes soon after their attacks. When regular soldiers were near, there was no way open for 
them to seizure in their own country.” 20 
These ideas of the Russian officer reflected a sharp contrast with the Ottoman officer 
Arif, who said that the auxiliary forces could not be gathered on time, because it was very 
hard to supply and transfer them. Even if the war had not taken place, the problem of 
                                                 
19 Averyarov,19. Asırda Rusya, Türkiye Iran Muharebeleri, pp. 97-98. 
20 ibid, p. 98. 
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provisions would have been a great burden.21 Mehmet Arif writes that Sheikh Ubeydullah 
joined the Eleşgirt regiment with 1,000-2,000 auxiliary horsemen and soldiers at a time two 
months later than expected, when he heard that the Ottoman Army had crossed the Russian 
frontier at Beyazid.22 
  Avreyarov also points to the same difficult position of the Ottoman forces by citing 
one of the telegrams of Faik Paşa to Ahmet Muhtar Paşa. When the government recognized 
the disorder in the army, it asked for its exact condition and why the sheikh had not kept his 
promises. Faik Paşa replied that the demands of the sheikh had not been satisfied, which made 
the transfers slow and according to the sheikh, the militias were still en route from various 
remote regions. Some of these militias arrived only under constant pressure from Faik Paşa. 
In April, Faik Paşa moved to Bargiri (Muradiye) by the order of Ahmed Muhtar Paşa. 
According to Faik Paşa’s report of May 20 to Ahmed Paşa, the militias promised by the 
sheikh had not yet arrived: “On May 10 Faik Paşa had 500 Kurdish cavalries, and by May 20 
this force had reached 1,000. On May 25 it numbered 5,000, and on May 27 it was understood 
that a force of 7,000-8,000 men had been gathered. Later with the additions this force reached 
12,000 men. Despite this, their attacks were very weak. The leading units were only able to 
reach the Aladağ passes on May 30.”23 
  On April 30, Russia’s Yerevan forces had conquered Beyazid without encountering 
opposition. Beyazid was at the intersection of the Russian-Iranian frontier. Its geographical 
situation made it hard to defend against the Russians. Ottoman forces fell back to Bargiri 
without carrying general goods. The Russian Army occupied Beyazid with around 1,500 
soldiers. When Ottoman forces at Eleşgirt attacked the Russians on the way to Diyadin, 
Ahmed Paşa ordered Faik Paşa to move towards Beyazid. He arrived with two regiments 
along with 3,000 irregular soldiers and ragtag horsemen which he had collected since the 
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beginning of war.24 Avreyanov gives the total as 15,000.25 Two Russian infantry regiments 
had remained in one of the barracks in the center of town. After negotiations, the soldiers 
agreed to leave their guns and become prisoners of war. But while exiting the barracks in 
order to hand over their guns, they were attacked by Kurds, who killed most of them. With the 
help of Kurdish leaders, Faik Paşa tried to prevent the torture of the surviving soldiers. Seeing 
the inevitable treatment they would face, the soldiers ran back to the barracks and refused to 
submit. Seventy of the surrendered soldiers were robbed. Later these soldiers were dressed 
and sent to Istanbul by the way of Halep.  
Faik Paşa then left two battalions of regulars under the command of Colonel Mehmet 
Münip Paşa. When Sheik Ubeydullah insisted, three cannons were given to these battalions. 
The Russian infantries remained under constant fire for 30 days. On June 13, the Russian 
Army sent 1,500 horsemen and soldiers to help, but they retreated after losing 40 of their 
number. The pinned down soldiers were only saved after General Ter Gukasov entered the 
city of Beyazid and retreated on July 2.26 Later Faik Paşa was relieved of command due to 
this affair. 
Arif tells of Kurds opening the graves of the Russian soldiers who were killed at the 
Halyaz battle in order to rob the corpses of their clothes.27 In general, he criticized the 
Circassian and Kurdish cavalries’ abuse and mistreatment of local peasants, especially the 
Armenians. Even the regulars were not supplied with sufficient foods and clothes during the 
war. Not surprisingly, serious epidemics struck the population and necessary medical 
treatment was scarce. Charles Ryan tells of seeing dogs eating human flesh in Erzurum where 
he served as a doctor under the Red Crescent.28  
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27 Ibid. p. 378. 
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All the above information brings to mind the much-neglected role of Sheikh 
Ubeydullah in the Ottoman-Russian war. He played an important role in the conflict, which 
attracted a base that he would use later in his movement of 1880. How Sheikh Ubeydullah 
used his influence on the other sheiks is hard to determine, since their motives for entering the 
war are not available to us. In any case, one can expect that Sheikh Ubeydullah made good 
use of his spiritual charisma over the others by occupying a leading position in the 
Naqshebandi-Halidi order. One of the main causes of the war had been religious differences, 
which created an arena for the sheikh to wield his power. 
The spread of diseases and famines due to the war was no less effective than the 
Naqshebandiyya Sufi order thoughts. The poverty-stricken population easily gathered around 
the sheikh to support his campaigns towards Tabriz and Urmiye. The defeated Ottoman 
soldiers left most of their guns in the field. Some of these guns had been directly distributed to 
the conscripted auxiliary horsemen. Arif says that the cavalries also demanded the Henry 
Martini rifles which they saw in the hands of the soldiers. These rifles were long and difficult 
to use on horseback. When the advantages of their longer firng range was recognized in a 
cavalry confrontation, some Henry Martini rifles were brought from the store of Kars and 
distributed to the horsemen. The horsemen had been using Winchesters, which have a shorter 
range than the Russian Berdan-type rifles.29 It is easier to gauge the effects of these rifles in 
the hands of Kurds than to determine the teachings of Mevlana Khaled among the hearts of 
sincere believers. Thus Iskender Quryans30 told how these guns changed hands after the 
defeat: “During the Russian and Ottoman war, Sheikh Ubeydullah, like the wolf spying his 
prey and hunting grounds clearly in the mist, with his son Sheikh Sadık and some other 
                                                 
29 Arif, Başımıza Gelenler p. 417. 
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sheikhs fought and conquered Beyazid on behalf of Ottoman concerns. After that, they 
promised the governor of Van they would collect 50,000 Kurdish units under the sheikh’s 
order and fight with the Russians. The Ottoman state asked them to go to the capital city, but 
instead all of them sent only their spokesmen to Istanbul. The sheikh also appointed Reşid 
Beğ in his place. When these envoys reached Istanbul, they gave many inconsistent and 
unfulfillable promises and took some honorary medals before returning. When the sheikh was 
in Van, the governor told him that his stay there was necessary so that when they were faced 
with Russian attack, no siege would ensue. But the sheikh knew that he lacked reliable men to 
oppose the enemy in an orderly, disciplined way in a time of war. He was afraid of his 
corruption and fatigue and paid no heed to the governor’s words. He returned to his place and 
after that, asked permission from the Porte to go Caucasia and wage war against the Russians, 
but no such permission was forthcoming. The mood of the sheikh and his followers, the 
brigand Kurds, was never at one with the Ottoman government, nor were they wholly 
obedient. During the last Russian and Ottoman war, initially the sheikh’s followers united en 
masse with the Başıbozuks during the war hoping for loot and booty, but when the Ottoman 
soldiers’ defeat seemed imminent, they were in fact the first to pillage the Ottoman Army. 
They took expensive guns, among them Henry Martini rifles, from the hands of fleeing 
soldiers and took them to the Iranian frontier where they sold the guns cheaply.” He also told 
of the militias under the sheikh’s command plundering the 50 Armenian villages around 
Başkale and turning their military installations at Eleşgirt into a desert. They sacked the tomb 
of St. Bartholomew, an important pilgrimage place for the local Armenians, and razed it with 
the help of the son of Ali Han Şikaki. Quryans claims that later, the son of the sheikh came to 
argue with the son of Ali Han Şikaki over the booty, and some were killed.31 Here Quryans 
seemed to confuse the conflict between Ali Khan Şikaki’s son Maşe and the sheikh’s son 
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Abdulkadir. The conflict between them did not arise from the old dispute over the distribution 
of pillage booty as Quryans claimed, but rather from a different source entirely. According to 
Celile Celil, in the beginning of July 1880 the governor of Urumiye asked Abdulkadir to 
collect taxes from the Somai district and bring them to the government. Abdulkadir refused. 
Then the governor resorted to another notable Kurdish leader in the region to apply his divide-
and-rule policy. Therefore Ali Khan sent his son to the Somai district. Sheikh Ubeydullah 
made preparations to send military help to Abdulkadir. Ali Khan grew frightened when he 
heard of these preparations, so he avoided carrying out the governor’s orders. His son Maşe 
visited the sheikh in order to show his loyalty. Ali Khan told the governor that he had had no 
opportunity to complete the assigned task due to the threat of a clash with the sheikh.32  
When the city of Beyazid was captured on June 9-11, the Kurds confiscated the 
property there, making no distinction between Muslims and Christians. The leaders ignored 
these injustices, because they were unable to keep their promises of stipend payments and so 
such acts by the militias were considered inevitable. After a short time, they scattered to the 
Beyazid plain and plundered even the local Kurdish villages. Averyanof tells of the invasion 
of Surp Ohannes, an Armenian Church by Kurdish militias on June 13 June. But a Russian 
Army major named Karapivi unexpectedly attacked them while they were still at the 
monastery. He set fire to it, and as a result 37 men were burned alive. Avreyanof claimed that 
most of them were important tribal leaders and sheikhs.33  
Basil Nikitine also points to the importance of these rifles in the initial confrontation 
of the sheikh with the governor of Azerbaijan. He puts the number of Ubeydullah’s tribal 
conscripts who during the war were encamped around Van and Başkale at 70,000. They 
returned from the war empty handed, much to their disappointment. But they were able to 
procure much military materiel such as Henry Martini rifles with cartridges. This made the 
                                                 
32 Celile Celil, 1880 Şeyh Ubeydullah Nehri Kürt Ayaklanması, p. 89. Later Ali Han Şikak with Timur Paşa 
committed excesses to suppress the villagers after the 1880 movement of the sheikh. Y. PRK. ASK... 5/70.  
33 Averyarov, ibid. p. 106. 
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frontier region attractive, and there were many incursions towards the border zone. Around 
that time Ahmed Mirza Mu’in Devle was assigned to the Urmiye governorship in order to 
administer and completely regulate the frontier affairs. When Major Ikbalu’d Devle was 
assigned to the same post to succeed him, he immediately prepared a report on the sheikh’s 
dangerous intentions,34 which however failed to get the attention it deserved. When Seyit 
Abdulkadir (the son of Sheikh Ubeydullah) invaded the Mergaver district with Hamza Ağa 
Mangur, and they attacked the Sawjbulak (Mahabad) district with powerful forces, his brother 
rushed to Somai Baradost with 4,000 cavalries and soldiers. Ikbal Devle left Urumiyeh with 
the Ninth Regiment of Khoy together with the Seventh and Eighth Afşar Regiments of 
Muhacir and Karacadağ. At that time, most of the new Afşar regiments under the command of 
Mehmed Bagir Han Suca Devle were at Horasan in order to protect the frontier, and the others 
were at Şiraz under the command of Bagir Han Sertip. The guns of the officers were the old 
models; there were only 400-500 of the new-type rifles. When Ikbal Devle met Sheikh Sıddık 
forces near the Kasalar and Badilbu region, there were substantial casualties and losses.35 
 
Chapter 2 
International Conditions  
A brief review of international conditions will be useful for understanding how the Ottoman 
naqshebandi sheikh’s movement became a source of acute concern for powers in the region. 
The 1877-78 Ottoman-Russian War ended with the catastrophic defeat of Ottoman forces as 
well as the Russian Army uncomfortably near Istanbul. When the British fleet appeared at the 
Dardanelles Straits, it became clear that the lion’s share of the conditions would be 
determined by Russia and Great Britain. In this context a weak Ottoman Empire served the 
common interest of both powers, since its collapse would cause huge problems for the issue 
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of partition. The Russian presence in the eastern Mediterranean was unacceptable for Britain 
due to the importance of the Suez Canal as its gateway to the Indian Ocean. A weak state on 
the Straits also meant the postponement of a decisive Russian blow until it could acquire the 
necessary power to realize its ambitions on Istanbul. Throughout the century the constant 
threat of Russia against European concert had been checked by coalitions spearheaded by 
Britain. In this struggle, the Near East and especially the Ottoman Empire were the foci of 
tensions. During the Crimean War, Russian came to realize its military incompetence, thus 
proving that its expansionist policies were not without cost. The monarchic empire was 
incompetent in dealing with persistent internal tensions and rather than suppressing reform 
demands in the continent, it had to face its domestic problems. Whereas maintaining the status 
quo had been the Russian Empire’s classic international policy, after its Crimean defeat this 
policy turned from protecting and establishing reactionary monarchies on the Continent 
towards a basis of supporting nascent national states. Moreover, realizing that the Near East 
was blocked, Russia found in the Middle and Far East a new frontier in which to expand. In 
1865-76 such petty khanates as Tashkent, Bokhara, Samarkand and Khiva, plus Kokand in the 
Middle East, were annexed to Russian territory.36 In this period, Russian tried to strengthen its 
position in the Transcauscassia, and its central foreign policy concerns shifted from the 
Ottoman Empire to Iran. 
 The insecurity and misadministration in Persia created an unstable balance that could 
pave the way for foreign intervention. When Persia occupied Herat in 1856, Great Britain 
retaliated by landing an expeditionary force at Bushire. Persia was forced to evacuate Herat, 
but the incident showed that it was not impossible for Russia to establish a puppet government 
in Tehran through giving military support to a possible prince. When Nasreddin Shah realized 
that foreign intervention was unavoidable, he adopted a policy of encouraging foreign powers 
                                                 
36 Barbara Jelavich, A Century of Russian Foreign Policy p. 169. 
 20 
to invest in Persia in the hope that they would help spur development and prosperity. 
Nasreddin had visited Europe three times, evidence of his leaning towards westernization, but 
the fragmented state of Persian society and the competition of powers and factions over 
concessions and monopolies led to the failure of his policies.37 
During the Balkan crisis a small frontier skirmish took place between Ottoman and 
Persian forces, thus indicating the potential future for the movement of the sheikh. In this 
incident some Persians attacked the border village of Kaşkabulak. When villagers asked the 
nearby garrison for help, a captain named Ahmed Ağa took 10 of his soldiers to protect the 
village. During the clashes, one Ottoman soldier was killed and the others were wounded, as 
the Persian soldiers outnumbered the Ottomans. Seven captured Ottoman soldiers along with 
their captain were taken to the city of Khoy. The Ottomans, however, had also captured a 
Persian captain and seven soldiers and claimed that they were captured during the clashes. 
The Persian ministry, for its part, depicted rather a different picture from the Ottomans. It 
declared that in an Ottoman attack on the Persian border its forces had captured a captain and 
seven soldiers, and claimed that when some Ottoman soldiers in the Khotour region heard of 
this, they invited a Persian captain and seven soldiers to breakfast as a ruse to capture them. 
Eventually the prisoners of this undeclared border clashes on both sides were exchanged. 
 It is useful to remember that the indefinite frontier and lack of communications at that 
time made such maneuvers possible for both sides, but the ratio between the captives makes 
the Persian account more credible in this particular event.  The Ottoman ambassador, after 
stressing the empire’s military might, said that although facing a crisis in the Balkans region, 
the empire’s remaining territory was at peace, adding that the Erzurum and Baghdad armies 
were not affected by the existing conflict. After extending some diplomatic assurances, the 
Persian side asserted that such incidents happen in order keep the border secure and prevent 
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aggression from the Ottoman tribes, insisting further that the reason for dispatching soldiers to 
the frontier was the Ushnu affair and provocation by Sheikh Ubeydullah. The Erzurum 
Governorship denied these claims, claiming that on the contrary, Sheikh Ubeydullah was 
holding back disorder.38 This incident, in which the two sides’ retaliation was both 
inconclusive and unproductive, underscores the persistently unsettled nature of the border 
dispute. 
It was not only the sheikh’s charisma that permeated through the weak border between 
Ottoman territory and Iran. The holy places of Najaf (Necef) and Karbala (Kerbala) were of 
the utmost concern to the Shiite sect. These places increasingly interested Iran’s government 
during the last quarter of the 19th century. Through their control the Persian state tried to 
garner popular support. The holy shrines of the Imams are an important component of Shiite 
Islam. Together with the incursions of unsettled tribes on both sides of the border, the holy 
places and Iraq’s Shiite minority was jeopardizing relations between the two empires. The 
tribes crossed the unsettled borders either because their traditional ways of pasturing forced 
them to do so, or because they simply wanted to benefit from lucrative trade or pillaging to 
supplement their standard of living. In this case the lip service each central government paid 
to allowing provocative acts by their subject tribes exasperated its counterpart, which then 
retaliated for the offenses committed. 
The Persians followed a policy that attracted the Porte’s attention. Shahzade (prince) 
Husame Sultane, the shah’s uncle as well as a skilled, important top Iranian commander, had 
already declared his intention to occupy Baghdad were he ordered to do so. While he wanted 
to make a pilgrimage to Mecca with his retinue, he stated that such a task would be very easy 
and worth dying for, pointing to the opportunities realized during the empire’s handling of the 
Balkan crisis. The official correspondence from the Ottoman Embassy in Tehran to the 
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Foreign Ministry informs that 10,000 kiyye bullets were ordered from Qazvin to Tabriz to 
send to the border troops, and at the same time the Persian government assigned a special 
commission to buy artillery from the United States, choosing the same Henry Martini rifles 
used by the Ottoman Army. More portentously, the shah consulted his court and decided to 
take back Karbala at the earliest opportunity. The Ottoman ambassador said that the shah 
found it useful to prepare troops and conscript soldiers from various provinces, totaling 
40,000 for that purpose all told.39  
Ironically the reason the shah bypassed Istanbul en route to St. Petersburg was 
attributed to the 1877-78 war, when the shah chose to travel via St. Petersburg in order to visit 
an international exhibition in Paris. The Ottoman ambassador noted the jubilation, both 
spoken and unspoken, in the court of Iran when Kars fell to the Russians and the Ottoman 
Army retreated to Erzurum. Although they had always stressed the general solidarity of Islam, 
the shah met with a Russian general who had been at Kars the very day he arrived in Tehran, 
which was unusually hasty as normally such meetings occurred only after a two- or three-day 
wait. The Ottoman ambassador also warned that if the Ottoman Army were attacked at the 
beginning of spring, the Persians might march towards Van and Baghdad. The fact that the 
Russian influence was increasingly felt in Persia can be also seen in the same correspondence 
of the Ottoman ambassador from Tehran, this time telling of another general called Frankini, 
who after staying six or seven months in Tehran returned to Tblisi via Tabriz. Meanwhile he 
contributed to military reforms and arranged the artillery while in Tehran.40  
 
The Eastern Question   
After the 1870 Franco-Prussian War, the foundation of the Three Emperors League had to be 
modified under the newly unified Germany. Russia began to pursue its privileges in the 
                                                 
39 Ibid. 
40 Y.A.Hus. 1,30 from the Ottoman Embassy in Tehran to the Foreign Ministry 1295-3-7. 
 23 
Balkans under the pretext of pan-Slavism rather than the protection of Orthodox Christians. 
The direct emphasis on nationality rather than religion constituted a more potent policy 
against the Ottomans. The freedom of southern Slavs from Muslim rule under the leadership 
of Russia was the main aim of pan-Slavism. In general, the Balkan population began to be 
more exposed to nationalist agitation. Pan-Slavism also attracted popular support among 
influential individuals in Russia’s court and society, which affected its support for an imperial 
ideology.41 The 1875 Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis and the 1876 Bulgarian rebellion had led to a 
European reaction against the Ottomans, something that Russia manipulated easily in the 
international diplomatic arena. These crises lessened the Russophobia felt in Europe and also 
helped secure Austrian assent for a Russian military campaign in the Balkans, even though 
pan-Slavist propaganda also had implications for the Slavs under Habsburg yoke. The 
Ottoman Empire was unable to implement necessary “reforms” for its Christian subjects, and 
the Russians declared war on the empire when its international public image was at an all-
time low.  
When the possibility of Russian occupation of Istanbul emerged, Britain moved its 
fleet through the Dardanelles on February 18, 1878. The negotiations of February 19-March 3 
ended with the Treaty of San Stefano. Britain was alarmed by Russia’s acquisitions in Asia 
Minor and the possibility it could advance further through “Armenia” to the Mediterranean 
Sea. The port of Batum could become a suitable naval base for attacks on Istanbul. On March 
27, Disraeli persuaded the Cabinet to call up the reserves and have troops moved from India 
to Malta for the secret purpose of seizing a military installation in the eastern Mediterranean.42 
On June 4 Great Britain offered its protection to Istanbul against further Russian 
encroachments in exchange for its occupation of Cyprus. Although a naval base at Cyprus and 
a fleet in the Aegean could offset a Russian threat through the Straits and keep the status quo 
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so Britain could retain superior naval power, the new Russian acquisitions in eastern Anatolia 
and its influence on local Christians would give it an opportunity to expand overland to the 
Mediterranean or to Basra, something Britain could hardly check. When the Great Powers 
assembled at the Berlin Congress on June 13, a new dimension was added to the Eastern 
Question.  
During the decade after the war, the complicated nature of the Armenian problem and 
the ambiguity of the provisional reforms remained unresolved. By carrying the threat of 
instability, the sheikh movement in the region abetted these issues resisting solution. The 
alarming international recognition that his movement received can be seen in this context.  
As stated in Article LX of the Treaty of Berlin, “The valley of Alascherd and the town 
of Bayazid, ceded to Russia by Article XIX of the Treaty of San Stefano, are restored to 
Turkey. The Sublime Porte cedes to Persia the town and territory of Khotour, as fixed by the 
mixed Anglo-Russian Commission for the delimitation of the frontiers of Turkey and Persia.”  
A brief evaluation of Article LX is a simple matter: Through an acquisition of the 
strategically important valley of Alascherd, possible further Russian land encroachment 
against the Ottomans was prevented and the massive Russian land gains to date were in a 
sense offset. But the cessation of Khotour territory to Persia would be the next issue between 
the empires through its status as an important pass to Urmiye from Van. Article LXI of the 
treaty stipulated, however, “The Sublime Porte undertakes to carry out, without further delay, 
the improvements and reforms demanded by local requirements in the provinces inhabited by 
the Armenians, and to guarantee their security against the Circassians and Kurds. It will 
periodically make known the steps taken to this effect to the Powers, who will superintend 
their application.”43 
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The ambiguity of Article LXI was obvious, since the means for the Sublime Porte to 
realize the implementation of these reforms after such a defeat remained obscure. In fact after 
the urgent problems of Montenegro and Thessaly were solved, the Porte constantly cited its 
insufficient administrative and financial situation as a pretext for deferring reforms or at least 
delaying them. As for the demands for reforms, military consuls assigned to the region 
accomplished nothing more than piling up the number of petitions remaining unresolved.44 
Moreover, these military consuls also changed the assignments of many governors who were 
considered to be slowing down the reforms. The consuls there, in the eyes of Muslims and 
Christians alike, were a “continual reminder of the overshadowing power of the Christian 
kingdom of the West. They were a sign to the people, an omen of the future, ‘casting out 
devils’ in a literal sense, for a where a Mohammedan governor was found by them oppressive 
beyond the average, his deposition followed.”45  
The Circassians and the Kurds were seen as the sole troublemakers. Their removal 
from office was firmly recommended by the consuls. Because of the prejudice against them as 
being completely illiterate nomads, they were excluded from the entire reform initiative, so 
the local Muslim majority became part of the problem rather than part of the solution. 
The reforms did not suffice to satisfy the desires of the locals, neither the Muslims nor 
the Christians. Although they were implemented as a British containment policy against 
Russian expansion in the Asiatic provinces, soon the Armenians began to prepare for revolt in 
places where they could count on Russian assistance in achieving their aims. The British fear 
of “Armenians thrown into the arms of Russians” was uppermost in British diplomatic policy 
until March 1881, when Czar Alexander II was assassinated by a nihilist. Afterwards, Russian 
policy became more restrictive against the nationalist affairs of its Armenian subjects.  
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The movement of the sheikh to the extent of bringing Russian intervention on behalf 
of Armenians was alarming for the British consuls, as on December 29 when a Persian 
general arrived in Van demanding the punishment of the sheikh as well as the surrender to 
Persian authorities of Kurds who had fled across the frontier. Reportedly, the Russians had 
40,000 men with 40 or 50 guns near Nakhichevan and there was a bridge train at Yerevan and 
other equipment for taking the field. It is supposed that this concentration of troops was meant 
to lend assistance to Persia in case such was needed.46  
Russian involvement in the affair was weakening the already delicate balance 
established in the region and moreover led Britain to put more pressure on the Porte to settle 
the dispute. On February 25, Van Consul Captain Clayton informed Major Trotter about 
150,000 Armenians ready to cross the frontier to give assistance, adding that the Russian 
government had encouraged them and sold them arms for a quarter of the price originally 
paid. Captain Clayton relied on his interview with a Mr. Barnum, an American missionary 
who based his information on two Armenians from Tblisi sent there by their committees. 
These Armenians told Barnum that all preparations had been made to come the assistance of 
Turkish Armenians in the autumn, as when Sheikh Ubeydullah first began to move. At first it 
was supposed that he was coming to massacre the Christians, but when his moves were 
observed and understood, the movement was postponed. The consul thought if the sheikh rose 
up again, this would be a signal for the movement among Armenians as well, and in his words 
“there seems to be very little doubt that [the sheikh] is making great preparations for a fresh 
rising in the spring. From all sides reports come in of drilling among the Kurds, and it is said 
that the sheikh is paying his troops, giving 2 liras a month to the officers, and a medjidie a 
month to the men. The British consuls saw Turkish authorities, however, profess to place no 
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credit in these reports of preparations.”47 This agreed with Persia’s view that the Ottomans 
were provoking a revolt among its Kurdish subjects. On March 17, 1881, Mr. Goschen 
informed Earl Granville, relying on the report of the Van consul, that Sheikh Ubeydullah was 
preparing for a fresh uprising. 
At the time, the British authorities were expecting a revolt among the Armenians with 
Russian assistance. They were in the region specifically to head off such events. They 
considered the reforms the only remedy against sentiment in favor of revolt and the leaning of 
local Armenians towards Russia. The possibility the sheikh movement would turn against the 
Armenians and the need to protect them militarily would have left British diplomatic policy 
confused and eased the Russian intervention. As for the implementation of reforms, the 
Ottoman state naturally remained unenthusiastic, since it knew from its previous experiences 
in the Balkans that the reforms would bring fresh territorial losses. How the Christian 
populations of the Balkans turned to the empire’s enemies under the banner of “reforms” not 
so long ago was not something to be forgotten. Even if the empire wished to adopt necessary 
policies in those fragile and depressed times, it could not hope to succeed against the financial 
and administrative barriers it faced.  
In general the British diplomatic policy of enforcing reforms and peace was secondary 
to its containment policy against possible Russian expansion. The “Great Game” between 
Russia and Britain at the time led to differering and sometimes conflicting results with respect 
to imperial policies. In order to curtail Russian expansion in Asia, the tribal and semi-state 
structures existing in a wide swathe from Afghanistan to Transcaucasia had been subject to 
constant shaping according to imperial needs. It is not surprising that the same imperial policy 
might imply different views in such a vast region. For example, when the Russian border with 
Persia was closed gradually during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the nomadic 
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tribes of Shahseven were devastated. In order to check the increasing influence and 
colonization of Russia in the Mogan basin, Britain stressed the crucial contribution of these 
tribes to the Persian economy and military. Therefore, the British consuls put forth these 
reasons and tried to cast blame on the Persian side for its possible losses if the Russian 
settlement policy succeeded. The pass through the borders was vital for the Shahseven tribes, 
who because of their nomadic way of life were totally dependent on travel between pastures 
on both sides of the border. The Russian settlement policy gradually resulted in the closure of 
the border for these tribes.48 In contrast, in eastern Anatolia almost the same tribal structures 
were holding back the so-called “implementation of reforms” backed by the British interest in 
pursuit of containment policy. These tribes were seen at the root of disobedience to law and 
order in the region, and the reforms envisioned new judicial and administrative organs, with 
equal representation of Christians and Turks as a precondition. Such a view went along with 
the Western sympathy towards the shackled co-religionists living under cruelty with no 
authority to protect them.  
The diplomatic policy not only discriminated against the locals but also wreaked 
havoc among the existing administrative order. As a result, the Ottoman administrative staff’s 
sphere of authority intersected with the consuls’ sphere of influence in a conflicting manner. 
Although the Porte always wanted to see these consuls completely isolated from intervention 
in internal affairs, the empire’s great defeat gave them important space to maneuver in. 
Almost the whole of the existing Ottoman administration was considered incompatible with 
the reform program.  
The existing power in the hands of administration had not been checked or balanced in 
the modern sense. Moreover, the war and the grave problems in its wake revealed the implicit 
cruelty in the governing mechanism. One of the most unwanted was Kurt Ismail Paşa, who 
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was criticized for his abuse of Christians among other offenses. Avreyanof referred to 
Kurdish militias sacking and plundering the war region, charging that Ismail always defended 
those offenders, Ahmed Muhtar Paşa’s orders to punish and hang them notwithstanding.49 
Such events can give a sense of the power at the disposal of an administrator under such 
conditions when power was naturally used in an arbitrary manner.  
Since the safety of local Christians was of the utmost concern, the establishment of 
gendarmeries was an important step in the reforms. The head of the reform commission was 
Abidin Paşa, who won British admiration for his harsh measures against the local notables. 
Stephen Duguid has stressed Abidin’s reliance on local urban notables in order to eliminate 
his rivals, the “aghas” in the countryside. He had no alternative but to rely on the advice of 
those urban notables, since he was an Albanian and a stranger to the area. The city was under 
their control and they had already used their influence among the local population to get rid of 
the old governor and discredit the local government in the process. Abidin Paşa’s sole choice 
was felt drastically when he used advice from these notables to fill vacancies and new 
positions in the administrative and judiciary. These new office-holders in turn pursued their 
own self-interested agenda in order to gain the upper hand against their rivals, namely rural 
notables, Kurdish aghas and former representatives from the central government. As a result, 
according to Stephen Duguid, “He invited a hundred of them (aghas) to Diarbekir 
[Diyarbakır], ostensibly to discuss the problems of the vilayet, and then had them arrested and 
exiled from the area. The Aghas were to be sent to Albania but owing to interference from 
Istanbul never got farther than Aleppo.”50  
Duguid’s remarks may reflect the difficulties faced by any possible candidate in terms 
of reforms and obstacles to the reforms. Moreover, the chances for any reform were limited 
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seriously straightaway by budget constraints when Istanbul forbade any change that would 
increase the budget of vilayets. 
  A short review and exploration of a single judicial case would help to demonstrate the 
potential gap between crime and punishment at that time and the resulting injustice. One 
important document from the Ottoman archive provides us with just this opportunity.51 The 
turmoil of the judicial process was the natural outcome of a situation in which convicts and 
suspects were far removed from their legal proceedings. As the conclusions of judicial rulings 
were delayed, petitions to the Porte mounted, highlighting the arbitrariness of the procedure 
and the resulting hardships suffered by the families of suspects and convicts. Aziz Paşa, the 
governor of Mamurat’il Aziz (Elazığ), who was assigned the task of investigating, divided 
convicts into three groups, namely ring leaders (elebaşılar), hard-core criminal thugs, and 
petty criminals. Although he considered harsh measures against the first two groups to be 
necessary, he thought that steps for the last group should be dealt in quick, on the spot 
proceedings. But the Armenian problem and the increasing complaints of local Christians via 
their patriarchies in Istanbul, along with pressures from foreigners, made exile verdicts 
politically sensitive. Legal procedures were under huge international pressure, and in that 
depressed period of the empire, suspects could not be sent back to Diyarbakır to complete 
their adjudication. Even some like Seyfeddin fled, and there were rumors that others would 
also soon be released. The local Christians became more anxious, fearful of possible 
retaliation if the suspects were to reappear. The relatives of suspects in custody increased their 
oppression towards Christians, since they were seen as the instigators of the catastrophe by 
their constant complaints against the suspects. Moreover, the same files give an interesting 
account of the escape of Eyüp Begzade Halil and Heri’e and Milli tribe leaders such as 
Ibrahim, Mehmed, and Ali from Sivas, while they were going to the bath (hamam) under the 
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supervision of penal officers. They were not the only ones to flee; the notorious Musto Kotu 
was also successful, along with others such as Ismail Virdi, Şabo and Anter. The central 
government realized that the possibility of such incidents in Aleppo was far greater, where 
crowded convicts were kept in military barracks rather than in prisons, making the problem 
worse once soldiers and the servants of notables were added to the convicts. Izzet Paşa also 
pointed to corrupt officials in Diyarbakır and their control of the administrative apparatus 
during the special conditions enjoyed over the last 20 years, and therefore he could not have 
been unaware of the local intrigues as with Abedin Paşa. Soon after the exile of those aghas, 
Abedin Paşa was assigned to other posts, first as a governor of Sivas and then of Salonica. 
Gradually Ottoman public opinion turned against the reforms once the threat to the 
eastern regions was better understood. Although the determined attitude of Great Britain 
yielded some Russian concessions in its land gains of Erzurum, Beyazit and Eleşkirt and the 
interior side of the Batum province, it was not so effective in taking Batum, Ardahan or Kars 
away from Russia. Ottoman public opinion turned against the European powers even more 
due to the recent warfare. The British occupation of Egypt and foreign control in the 
administration of Rumeli and Bosnia under the guise of impartiality and recognizing the 
sovereignty of the sultan there made the Porte suspect that the British Cyprus convention was 
a prelude to occupation. The financial condition of the empire plummeted on October 3, 1880, 
when the empire announced to its lenders a meeting to settle debts, and in 1881 paved the way 
for a public debt administration after the famous Muharrem Decree. The Ottoman government 
was highly offended by the refusal of its suggestion for British financial aid. According to 
Jwaideh, the empire was ready to sacrifice anything necessary in return for such aid. But 
Britain consistently refused the sultan’s credit demands, thus further offending the Ottoman 
government. As British influence waned significantly and relations with Britain deteriorated, 
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the ranks of reform opponents among the Ottomans swelled. The manner of such circles 
against reforms helped the Ottoman Empire’s tolerant attitude towards Sheikh Ubeydullah.52 
 
Chapter 3 
The Religious Order and the Tribal Basis 
His title “Nehri” suggests that Sheikh Ubeydullah was from the Sadat-e Nehri. This old 
dynasty resided in the Nehri village of Shemdinan. Over time, this family had important 
religious roles that had an enormous influence on the region and its surroundings. The family 
claimed to be descendants of the Prophet Muhammad (‘sadat’ is the plural of seyid in Arabic, 
meaning descendants of the Prophet), and more significantly the sheikh held an important 
position in the Naqshbandiyya-Halidiyya religious order. An analysis of the tribal structures 
of the region and the religious order can give us an understanding of the great influence the 
sheikh held when he mobilized them.  
Any researcher dealing with tribes faces a serious problem of documentation in its 
work. This difficulty is felt much more in history, since most of the tribes did not leave 
serious documents describing their own roles in important events. The extant documents do 
not belong directly to these social structures, as others outside of the tribe produced them – 
meaning government officials, travelers, etc. This fact can explain the tribes’ apparently 
frequent appearance in catastrophic events; unless they had no role in some turmoil, their 
presence in history is not so clearly discernible by historians. Modern researchers have tried to 
overcome this paucity of documentation by relying on anthropology and local studies. But 
historians must use the results of such studies cautiously. A simple transplantation of modern 
concepts into old contexts naturally carries the risk of serious errors of understanding.  
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Most studies dealing with these tribal structures have emphasized the external political 
factors determining the tribal unit and the subsequent power distribution within the unit. Other 
factors such as the economy and culture are also important in such analyses, but once these 
factors are carefully studied, they remain external to any tribe in the sense that tribes cannot 
determine their outcomes. A tribe can manage to survive as long as it can adapt itself to 
mercurial conditions rather than trying to change them. Even studies stressing the nomadic 
way of life in order to define the economic elements facing tribes also stressed their 
habituation to a barely tamed geographic region. Most of the time, the tribal formations were 
subordinated to their environment in many ways; culturally, they lacked sufficient institutions 
to produce a dominant culture, and geographically they lived in harsh conditions to which 
they had to submit. Under such conditions, they were cultural importers to a large extent by 
borrowing from their more centralized neighbors, and this transaction caused tribes to appear 
more like states. Here one can accept the definition of Gellner, who describes tribes as 
political units whose members jointly help maintain order internally and defend the unit 
externally.53 As this research tries to explain political events, such a simple definition will 
suffice. In this definition the state is the main variable external to the model, though along 
with other factors such as culture and the economy. 
In the case of Sheikh Ubeydullah, the extent of conflict found its expression in terms 
of religion as well. A large cultural gap between the sheikh’s followers and the Iranian 
Empire may point to the frequent secondary roles played by cultural differences. Even if some 
aspects of Sheikh Ubeydullah’s movement can be attributed to these cultural factors, their 
outcomes were largely shaped by international political factors that were more alien to his 
influence.  
                                                 
53 Ernest Gellner, “The Tribal Society and Its Enemies,” in The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and 
Afghanistan, ed. Richard Tapper. London: Croom Helm, 1983, p. 438. 
 34 
The classical Kurdish emirates of the Ottoman Empire lost their independence during 
the centralization process seen in the beginning of nineteenth century. The ensuing political 
vacuum was expected to cause more conflict in regions where tribal structures were dominant. 
Geographical barriers such as mountainous terrain made it hard to control the region and 
integrate it into the empire’s political structure, so these regions took on a special autonomous 
political status, with tribal structures constituting the main actors of social organization and 
power regulation. The new political dynamic after the defeat of the semi-autonomous emirates 
resisted stabilization due to intense rivalries between tribal units corresponding to former 
emirates. The central administration was unable to integrate and assimilate these tribes into its 
structure. In terms of implementing its central policies, the state succeeded at, at most, merely 
delegating authority among the competing units, thus intensifying the struggle among them. 
The increasing conflict further destabilized the power vacuum by effectively putting any kind 
of new equilibrium out of reach. The more advantageous position of the sheikhs gave them 
the chance to boost their influence. This they achieved by resorting to their arbitrary roles and 
by being outside the tribal realm. In the end this potential might explain their rise to power, 
but their main challenge lay in holding onto that power while staying fully within the classical 
emirates’ roles.  
The classical emirates had inherited a role that got the empire’s external recognition. A 
tribal leader might have other roles recognized by the center as well, but throughout this time 
military duties remained his primary obligation. This military obligation also found 
expression in the tribal unit, as the leader’s armed retinue and his own position needed 
verification by the center, despite the various transformations witnessed by the empire. For 
most of the sheikhs, these armed retinues could only be acquired after a difficult process. 
Keeping a military force at his disposal was a strikingly different role for a sheikh to play in 
front of his disciples. The fact that the ultimate power of Sheikh Ubeydullah was expressed in 
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terms of his armed retinue, not in the number of disciples he attracted, may give some idea of 
the extent of the transformations taking place.  
The existence of the emirates’ military obligations to the empire determined how the 
center delegated power. The tribes held military power in term of armed retinues. Therefore, 
within a tribe, one’s status as a leader was largely determined by having an armed retinue, 
besides having economic power. The leader of a tribe kept constant watch over the power 
situation of the constituent units. In his efforts to maintain order, his control over the armed 
retinue was crucial during both peace and wartime. This constant control was, however, 
something that the sheikhs lacked, which helps to explain their failure. 
The empire’s centralization movement coincided with important military reforms. The 
existing Yeniçeri order was abolished in 1826. The central government had to rely on 
auxiliaries to a large extent. The mobilization of conscripts was another complicating factor in 
the state’s task of arranging military maneuvers to carry out centralization policies. The state 
resorted to manipulating existing conflicts between the tribes. The means determined the 
ends, and such policies proved insufficient to deal with long-term problems. They aimed at 
specific cases and had to be implemented within a short timeframe. The state had to consider 
the power of tribes as a temporary solution. In such calculations, once the opposing tribe was 
determined, the state counted the power of that tribe’s enemy as an ally.  
Basil Nikitin gives a brief outline of Sadat-e Nehri, who was the Russian consul at 
Urmiya in 1915-18. Here among the war refugees from Turkey he met Said Qazi, a Kurdish 
mullah from Nehri and a religious teacher from the days of Ubeydullah’s son Mohammed 
Sıddık.54 The Sadat-e Nehri family claimed descent from Abdulqadir Geylani. His son 
Abdulaziz came to Aqra (to the northeast of Mosul) in order to spread the teachings of the 
Qadiri religious order. He died here, and his grave subsequently became an important 
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pilgrimage destination. Abdulaziz’s son Abu Bakr went to the Herki region and settled in the 
village of Stuni. After his death, Ebubekir’s son Sheikh Haydar and three or four of the 
succeeding generations also stayed in the same village. At the time of Mullah Hacı, the family 
moved to the village of Meleyan in the Humaro region. Several generations lived in this 
village and in the Demane Sufla village until the time of Mullah Salih. Mullah Salih moved to 
the village of Nehri together with his sons Abdullah and Ahmed. Until that time the family 
taught the Qadiriya order, but then his sons decided to quit Qadiri in favor of Naqshbandiyya-
Khalediyya.55 
Mevlana Ziyaeddin Khaled, born in 1776, was a common Kurd from the Jaf tribe in 
the Şehrizor region. After completing his education at the classical medreses in Sanandaj, 
Sulaimaniyah and Baghdad, he became a mullah in Sulaimaniyah and gave lectures there. 
After a pilgrimage to Mecca in 1805, he decided to go to Delhi. He got full permission to be a 
follower (khalifa) of Shah Gulam Ali of Delhi after staying in his lodge for one year. In 1811, 
he returned to Sulaimaniyah again in order to spread the teaching of the Naqshbandiyya order. 
Thereafter he established his own branch of the order, giving it his name, the Naqshbandiyya-
Khalediyya. 
Among the various mystical Islamic orders, Naqshbandiyya distinguished itself by 
strict adherence to the orthodox line. Unlike followers of many other paths, this order stressed 
Abubakr, the first caliph, in the transmission of their spiritual reality, rather than fourth Caliph 
Ali. This change in the chain reflected their opposition to the heterodoxy of other orders that 
justified their positions through the figure of Ali. According to Algar, the overt Shiite hostility 
to the order came from the fact that the first diffusions of Naqshbandiyya in the Sunni world 
coincided with the rise of a militant Shiite state in Iran and the beginning of centuries of 
sectarian warfare between Shiite Iran and its Sunni neighbors.56 They tried to consolidate the 
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shariah (religious rule) in terms of the actions of the Prophet (sunnet). Throughout its history, 
the order had been very effective in shaping the socio-political views of the Muslim societies 
where it was present. The scope of the present analysis makes it difficult to trace the 
interaction of the order’s views with the existing socio-political structure over such a long 
period. Yet one can easily say that in formulating such views, the order was always very keen 
to preserve the shariah and sunnet, and this active receptivity to its historical context made the 
order one of the most effective among the various mystical paths and also explains its long 
endurance and political orientation. 
The order first originated from Central Asia and owed its name to Bahaeddin 
Naqshband (1318-1389). Although the order was transformed by many leading sheiks, it 
retained the name Naqshband after Sheikh Bahaeddin. In the time of Ahmet Sirhindi, its area 
of influence centered on India, where the order tried to cope with Hindu influences on Islam. 
Fighting anything alien to Islam had long been the hallmark of the Naqshebandiyya order 
when Mevlana Khaled decided to become a disciple of Dehlevi. After Sirhindi, the need for 
renewal in order to deal with the changing conditions of Muslim societies was felt more 
acutely. This gave way to important reforms in the order that characterized its later politically 
reactive and interventionist attitude. It was not surprising that Naqshebandiyya initiated many 
battles against Western penetration and colonialism. After Sirhindi, the order began to be 
called Mujaddidiya, stressing the “renovation” witnessed in it, and leading it to become the 
most widespread and dynamic Sufi order. Although such characteristics are the main factors 
behind its large influence and staying power, they constitute great obstacles for historians. At 
any given time, the order lacked a collectively supported unique ideology that was identifiable 
across its various branches. Due to the variety of factors impacting such a widespread order 
and a lack of means of communication, the presence of different views defended by the 
order’s various branches was not unusual. 
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Martin Van Bruinessen explains the rapid spread of Naqshebandiyya-Khalediyya 
through two factors, one being the characteristics peculiar to this order, especially those that 
distinguish it from the Qadiri order. The second factor was the specific situation of the region 
at the time of the order’s introduction.57 
In fact, Khalediyya differed significantly from the existing Qadiri order, something 
which can be demonstrated by their different religious conceptions as well reflected in rituals. 
The ecstatic methods used in Qadiri rituals strongly contrasted with the silent zikir of 
Nakshabandiyya. The most significant difference for the present analysis can be found in their 
pattern of organization. The Qadiri order was more disposed to preserve its established 
organization. The khalifas of the Qadiri order were restricted by the limits of the lineage 
accepted as descendants of the Prophet, i.e. seyyids. Whereas the Naqshebandiyya had a more 
dynamic pattern of organization in which a given khalifa could give instructions to his own 
khalifas, a practice unknown in the Qadiri order. This can explain the rapid expansion of the 
order during the short life of Mevlana Khaled. During his lifetime, he appointed more than 65 
disciples and had some 12,000 disciples.58 This swift spread of the order caused a different 
perception of some of its basic tenets during the time of Mevlana Khaled. A disciple could 
generally enter the order’s path after an initiation period called the “suhba.” During this 
period, the candidate associated with and was accompanied by an accomplished sheikh who 
taught him the order’s rituals and led him on the path of knowing God. In this process, the 
absolute loyalty of the disciple to his sheikh was strengthened by means of a linkage called 
“rabita.” The time of Mevlana Khaled, however, witnessed important changes in both of 
these principles. In place of a longer initiation process, Mevlana Khaled adopted a more 
practical and faster method called the khalva erbainiyya (40 days of retreat) in Khaledi 
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practice. Through this practice, the disciple could enter his spiritual training earlier. Thus 
Mevlana Khaled eased the burden of a long-term of initiation in favor of more intensive 
training either under his control or that of a khalifa appointed by him. This time-saving and 
more rational method did much to help him rapidly spread the order over a span of only 16 
years. Besides time efficiency, the method also had the advantage of keeping down the 
accommodation costs of the disciples.59  
Rabita was the bond between the disciple and his spiritual guide, the sheikh. A sheikh 
could instruct his disciples to link with his image. In this way, loss of consciousness of this 
world and absolute loyalty to the preceptor were both achieved. As Manneh describes it, this 
stage of non-existence and unawareness of the world is reached “by evoking the image of the 
preceptor into the imagination and then transmitting it to the heart followed by the surrender 
of will. The more one is dominated by this state the more he losses awareness of this world.”60 
During Mevlana Khaled’s tenure leading the order, this rather mandatory practice was 
more frequently used and took on a more spiritual function. He demanded from his deputies 
that they and their own disciples and deputies should link directly with him, not with their 
immediate preceptors. Physical descriptions of the master were provided for the disciples in 
order that they might perceive their master better. Although this aroused many objections 
even during Mevlana Khaled’s own lifetime, it was very effective for winning the loyalty of 
disciples and deputies to their masters.  
How Mevlana Khalid decided to enter the Naqshebandiyya order gives important 
clues about the social situation of the time. One of the mystical interpretations mentions an 
incident during his 1805 pilgrimage to Mecca. There he encountered a dervish who was 
sitting with his back to the holy Kaaba (Ka’ba) shrine. Explaining his strange behavior, the 
dervish said that the servant of God in front of him was superior to the Kaaba and destined for 
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greatness, and so should seek spiritual instruction from his preceptor in India. After Mevlana 
Khalid’s return to Sulaiymaniya, he decided to travel to India with one of the disciples of 
Shah Ghulam Ali, Mirza Rahim Allah Azimabadi.61 Van Bruinessen points out that Mevlana 
Khaled had no previous Naqshebandi connections, but that on his way to India or perhaps 
shortly before he spent some time at the feet of Sheikh Abdullah, who accepted him into the 
Qadiri path.62 After Abdullah and his brother accepted the Naqshebandi order, the whole 
Sadate Nehri family began to follow the path. This initial acquaintance and early conversion 
explains the prominence of the Sadate Nehri order among various Khaledi ranks. They were 
later effective in spreading the order by appointing new deputies and disciples. Somehow, a 
similar initiation in terms of former acquaintances can explain another influential Siraj-ed-dini 
sheik at Hawraman.63 
The increasingly sensitive attitude towards respecting the sharia (religious rules) and 
preserving the essential structure of Muslim society against the increasing threats of the West 
gave the order a socio-political concern that was also shared by Mevlana Khaled. For him, the 
Ottoman state was the guarantor of the victorious presence of Islam, as long as it clung to 
sharia as source of its strength and durability.64 He added his prayer for the well-being of the 
Ottoman state and cursed the infidel Christians and apostate Persians. 
After the abolition of the Janissaries, the Ottoman state began to confiscate many 
Bektashi lodges. Important Bektashi centers were turned over to Naqshebandi 
administration.65 The religious orders were realizing important functions in Ottoman society 
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besides the purely religious one. The order benefited from the moderate attitude of the 
Ottoman state until the Tanzimat era, which was an important facilitator in its diffusion across 
Ottoman lands. Its opposition to Wahabism, a political and religious movement with many 
harmful affects on Ottoman rule in Arab lands, can be also evaluated in light of this. 
There is less information available about Sheikh Seyid Taha, Sheikh Ubeydullah’s 
father, who held an important position in the order after his uncle, Sheikh Abdullah. It seems 
he also had his disciples and appointed his deputies, among whom was his brother, Sheikh 
Salih. Some of them later held important positions in Turkey’s sociopolitical order, such as 
Sebgetullah Arvasi Geydali (the grandfather of Kamuran Inan), Sheikh Fehim Arvasi, Sheikh 
Muhammed Kufrevi and Sheikh Mella Ahmed-i Meczup. Other distinguished (disciples) 
deputies were Mella Taha (also known as “köse khalifa,” due to his sparse beard), Sheikh 
Taha el-Harici, Sheikh Islam u’l Kerkuki, Sheikh Haji el-Hakkari (whose grave is in Nehri), 
Sheikh Süleyman Bradosti and Sheikh Abdullah Neyniqi (the grandfather of Gıyasseddin 
Emre for whom a village in the Bulanık district of Mush is named).66  
Sheikh Taha attained spiritual power by holding an important position in the 
Naqshebandi order among the border tribes of Ottoman and Iran. Russia’s southward 
expansion in Transcauscasia made his control over them more important. We know that 
Sheikh Taha sent some warriors to Sheikh Şamil to aid his resistance against the Russians in 
Caucassia, and they also shared a correspondence. From this correspondence the Russian 
Consulate in Tabriz reported in 1848 that Sheikh Şamil had many disciples among the Kurds, 
who were sharing the same Şafi sect. Sheikh Şamil sent gifts to Seyid Taha and Kerim Khan 
of Rewanduz. Sheikh Şamil’s deputy Hasan, also known as Haji Murteza, used his teacher’s 
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permit to make visits to Kurdish-inhabited areas of Ushnu and Piraman. Meanwhile, however, 
Russia was also doing its best to head off the nascent warm relations.67  
Yalçın-Hekmann claimed that Sheikh Taha also actively participated in the Crimean 
War of 1854-56, but there is contradictory information in Averyarov, who claimed that 
initially the Ottomans tried to incite Persian Kurds rather than this happening through the 
influence of the bigoted Seyyid Taha. Towards that end, the Turkish and British Consulates at 
Tabriz sent their officers to every part of Persian Kurdistan. Confirming Taha’s relations with 
Sheikh Shamil, Averyarov added that he died before the beginning of war: “His brother, 
Sheikh Salih, then succeeded his position and was sitting at Berdesor. He was sending his 
deputies to Kurds in order to invite them to wage holy war against the Russians. He also 
gathered warriors among the Persian Kurds and make preparations to attack Russia. The 
Russian state asked Persia to arrest the sheikh and calm the restive Kurds, who were armed 
and taking his orders. Persia failed to give a definite reply due to its hypocritical diplomacy. 
In order to resolve this important situation, Russia sent a military delegation to Iran from 
Caucasia lead by General Sankvoski. The delegation conveyed the demands of the Russian 
side. The Persian government accepted them and so removed the sheikh from its lands and put 
its military units at the border in order to control the Persian Kurds.”68  
The Ottomans and Persians had already gone to war against the Russians twice during 
the first half of the nineteenth century. Persian Prince Abbas Mirza had relied extensively on 
Kurdish conscripts in his campaigns against the Russians. According to Averyarov, two-thirds 
of his 50,000 soldiers were recruited from among the Kurds in the campaigns of 1804-13, and 
in 1826-28 made up fully half of his 88,000-strong army.69 Thus, Sheikh Taha held important 
influence at the court of Qajarian Muhammed Şah, and the extent of his sway can be seen 
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thorough the memoirs of Abbas Mirza: “Taha was one of the greatest Sufis of 
Naqshebandiyya and the deceased Muhammed Şah, may God increase his salvation, gradually 
kept his advice and assigned some villages as tuyul and soyurghal to his hanagah. And every 
year he sent gifts and presents to him and the entire area of Kurdistan obeyed him. During 
those days he sent many visitors to me wishing my health and care. My mother was his 
disciple in the order.”70 The influence of Sheikh Taha at the Qajarian court had other 
dimensions besides religion. The Qajarians were well aware that he had a great many 
disciples and that through the order’s strong relations with the Ottoman Empire and a center 
very near their borders inhabited by many tribes loyal to him, he held an important power 
base that could be turned against them. Such a land grant can be evaluated in this context. The 
tribes under his influence straddled the border, and there was no barrier impeding their 
relations with the Naqshebandiyya order’s deputies. Ali Qajar pointed to Sheikh Taha’s 
influence in the court when he mentioned his occasional visits to Tehran and Tabriz. 
Muhammed Shah, under the influence of his servants, gave him 500 toman as a permanent 
salary, and assigned him five villages from the Mergaver district as tuyul. By so doing, he 
made the sheikh dependent on the state. Sheikh Taha never treated this favor ungratefully, and 
in the same way the mystics of the state always took care to follow his example.71 The 
southward expansion of Russia over Caucassia made Sheikh Taha’s religious influence 
something to be taken seriously by the Persian and Ottoman authorities. During the years the 
Ottoman state pursued a centralization policy, unlike the emirates, Sheikh Taha managed to 
consolidate his power base. 
In 1846, while returning from his visit to the Tiyari district, an area largely inhabited 
by Nestorians, British excavator and later Ambassador Layard noted a local sheikh’s hatred 
towards Christians. Layard had decided to make a short trip to the cooler climate of the Tiyari 
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Mountains in the summer during his excavations in the Mosul region. He mentioned in his 
famous memoirs a nearly blind sheikh with bigoted manners near a village named Kuremi. 
Layard claimed that this sheikh “had been the chief cause of massacres of the unfortunate 
Christians; and that, at that moment his son Sheikh Tahar [emphasis added] was urging Beder 
Khan Bey prove his religious zeal by shedding anew blood of the Chaldeans.”72 The immense 
influence held by Sheikh Tahar and the blindness reported by Layard is sound evidence for 
concluding that he was actually Sheikh Taha. He had a grave eye disease that explains his 
custom of veiling his face, rather than his worry of the impurity of Christian sights. 
The rapid Russian expansion and the growing European missionary presence may 
have lay at the root of Sheikh Taha’s alleged hatred towards Christians. Whether he instigated 
the Nestorian massacres remains unclear, but it is certain that he became an arbitrator between 
the Ottoman state and the fugitive Nurullah Beğ, the last Hakkari emirate who in 1848 fled to 




The Border Problem 
The arrangement of a long territorial border between the Ottoman and Persian Empires 
remained problematic. Each side continued to propose conflicting claims and trying to realize 
them. The Persians annexed the Zohab and Ahverik areas that the Ottomans had claims on. In 
1837, in retaliation, the Ottoman governor of Baghdad, Ali Rıza Paşa, invaded and destroyed 
Mahmere at the Persian border. In 1842, the province of Karbala was occupied by Persian 
troops trying to take advantage of the weak position of the Ottomans in the eastern regions. 
Ali Rıza Paşa soon retaliated and forced the Persian troops to retreat, taking many casualties 
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on local allies in the process. On May 13, 1847, the Treaty of Erzurum was signed between 
Iran and the Ottoman Empire. Over time, various committees had been assigned the task of 
determining the Ottoman-Persian border, and the most recent agreement on the status of 
Erzurum had even been signed again under pressure from the Russian and British services. 
Although it was not explicitly stipulated in the Erzurum agreement, the region belonged to 
Iran until the occupation of the Khotour Valley in 1848 by military units under the command 
of Derviş Paşa. The valley had a geopolitical advantage in case of a military offensive on 
Tabriz and Yerevan. This time another committee was assigned to determine the border. In a 
bid to frustrate Derviş Paşa’s efforts to win the tribes’ favor on border issues, the Persians 
appointed an official named Mirza Cafer Khan to the committee. The tension was 
concentrated in areas around Khotour, Egridağ and Çehrik. In a letter by Cafer Khan 
addressed to the people of Çehrik, Derviş Paşa was accused of trying to use unjust means to 
win tribal favor such as bribery and empty promises. Abdulhadi, the local Ottoman governor 
of Başkale, and Ömer Ağa of Rezki sent envoys to the surrounding area and incited the 
villagers of Çehrik. The villagers were deceived by a promise of a 10-year tax exemption. The 
Ottoman provincial governor (kaymakam) of Khotour, Abdulkadir by name, tried to persuade 
the villagers of Derik, Eşbatal and Şepiran to come and claim that their villages had always 
belonged to the Ottomans and sign papers declaring themselves Ottoman subjects. Using the 
same methods, the Ottoman governor of Başkale tried to persuade Mullah Mehmed of 
Şepirvan to issue petitions declaring they had been Ottoman subjects and that Iran had taken 
and recorded Maha as Persian property by force.74 At last Derviş Paşa succeeded in bringing 
over a tribal leader named Maksut Ağa along with three other elders to the border committee 
as witnesses. When the Ottoman claims were backed by Britain and the Persian side had to 
withdraw its troops in order to deal with 1848-52 Babai rebellions, the de facto solution 
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confirmed the Ottoman’s advantageous position. The committee continued its work, but the 
1854 Crimean War slowed their work down. After the war ended, Great Britain began to 
support the Ottoman claims against Iran more openly. In a clear challenge to the British 
policies, the Persian claims were naturally backed by Russia. In 1865, British topographers 
printed maps of the disputed territories with the participation of the Russians. In 1869, after 
the committee studied the issue and discussed it together with representatives from both 
empires, its conclusions were drawn up as an agreement to be signed later. The British 
consulate in Baghdad, Mr. Conbil, and the Russian military attaché in Istanbul, Mr. Zeynofi, 
participated in the committee assigned to settle the borders of the disputed lands.75  
In 1870, the Ottomans closed the border to the Celali tribe which had their winter 
quarters in Iran’s Avacek and Maku districts. The Ottomans told the Persian side about the 
closure and asked it to stop the Celalis from coming to their summer pastures. Iran ignored the 
Ottoman advisory, and the resulting clashes between military units and the tribe exacted 
serious losses for both parties. A similar incident resulted when policies implemented by Iran 
in 1872 caused the Jaf tribe of the Shehrizor region to be barred from passing through the 
border to reach their summer pastures.76 
The increasing influence of the sheikh was alarming for Persian officials. Unlike in the 
Erdelan province, the governors of the Mukri region to the southwest of Lake Urmiye began 
to be chosen largely from among Azeris. Heavy taxes and unfair means of tax collection were 
exacerbating the local conflict between the governors and the people. This conflict soon flared 
up on a well-founded basis of cultural differences and socio-economic instability. The Sunni 
and Shiite difference between the ruling elite as well as the constant warfare in the first half of 
the century had made the taxes a great burden on the peasants. Moreover, Iran owed a 
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significant sum in war indemnities to Russia, which increased further the onerous Persian 
taxes. 
In 1873, Urmiye Governor Yusuf Han Şuca Devle began trying to collect taxes 
directly from the villages belonging to Sheikh Ubeydullah, villages which had been assigned 
to his father as tuyul. The villagers, however, insisted on recognizing Sheikh Ubeydullah as 
the legitimate property owner and continued to pay taxes to him. The governor set fire to the 
villages, killing 48, and looted property worth some 50,000 tomans. Initially, Sheikh 
Ubeydullah sent his delegate Seyid Hasan to Tehran from Sawjbulak in order to make the 
incident known and issue a plea for justice. But his efforts to find a peaceful solution failed. 
The Persian authorities in Tehran ignored the rights of the sheikh, though they admitted that 
the villages at the south of Lake Urmiye were designated the sole property of Seyid Taha and 
that their residents had previously been exempt from taxes only during the time of Mehmed 
Shah.77  
This incident provoked a large reaction among the local tribes that led to the Ushnu 
affair. Subsequently, Ottoman tribes violated the border and sacked the Ushnu. Both sides put 
diplomatic pressure on the other for compensation. There were already mutual accusations, 
and the border tensions rose dangerously over the damage done by the incursions of the 
Hertuş tribe and Milan. In March 1874, the Persian government sent an officer named Mirza 
Sadık to investigate the region. In his report to the central government, he confirmed the 
legitimate claims of the sheikh. He indicated that Yusufhan had ill intentions in seizing some 
villages of the sheikh. Accordingly, Yusufhan gathered together some soldiers and Kurds 
from Ushnu and dispatched the men to the sheikh’s villages to pillage and destroy then. Mirza 
Sadık has pointed to Yusufhan’s rapid land purchases some time later, saying that no Iranian 
official had the authority to buy so much land.78 The mutual accusations continued, leaving 
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the problem unsolved. Iran claimed, for instance, that there would be no way for 7,000 
horsemen to cross the border without attracting the notice of Ottoman officers.79 The 
Ottomans, however, objected that root of the problem lay in the cruel methods used on local 
peasants, saying they were powerless to prevent such consequences after the provocative acts 
of Persian officials. Moreover, the Ottomans accused the Persian side of having instigated the 
encroachment of its subject tribes onto Ottoman lands. This encroachment, they argued, led 
the Ottoman tribes in turn to seek vengeance in Persian territory. Throughout the debate, the 
Ottomans based their arguments on the just cause of Sheikh Ubeydullah, saying that he 
deserved compensation. Although the sheikh had been victimized by the cruelty of Persian 
officials, he showed an admirable forbearance and had pursued peaceful means in seeking 
compensation. Iran countered the Ottomans’ demands for reparations of the sheikh’s rights by 
contending that some 50,000-60,000 tomans in damage had been done by two years of attacks 
by the Ottoman Hertushi tribe upon Persian soil and that this matter had yet to be settled by a 
commission charged with investigating it. After a year of debate, Iran rejected the sheikh’s 
rights to the lands, claiming that the papers meant to prove their transferal to him as tax-
exempt tuyul were either incomplete or downright forgeries, adding that due to either 
ignorance or willful delay in bringing the documents to light, he had impeded the 
commission’s work. Rather than giving him compensation, Iran asked the sheikh for all the 
taxes accrued over the last three years.80  
The Khotour region was becoming an increasingly problematic issue between the two 
empires. When the problems in the Balkans erupted into crisis in 1875, the Ottomans found 
that getting Britain’s cooperation against Persia was no easy task. Britain feared that Iran 
could follow the example of the Balkans and side with Russia, so its policy moved away from 
offering open support to the Ottomans on the border issue. Iran had initiated some 
                                                 
79 Qajarian documents # 568, p. 622. 
80 Qajarian documents #565 p. 615. 
 49 
engagements to declare open warfare against the Ottomans alongside the Russians. But such a 
proposition of cooperation was postponed, because Russia knew well that Persia would be a 
weak partner in a possible joint campaign. Open collaboration with Iran could also make 
Britain feel threatened and therefore force its hand in supporting the Ottomans more openly. 
Moreover, the Persians would be hard pressed to defend themselves against a direct British 
attack.81 In the Treaty of Berlin, by supporting the Persian claims on the Khotour Valley, the 
Russians had at the same time the advantage of solving their problem with the Persians 
concerning the Tekin Valley. In addition to leaving the Persian-Ottoman border dispute 
unresolved, the Treaty of Berlin also helped the Russians after the war to consolidate their 
status quo. In the treaty, the valley of Alascherd and the city of Beyazid were left to the 
Ottomans under the condition that the Khotour Valley would be given to Iran. On July 16, 
1880, the valley went into the hands of Iran.  
 
Chapter 5 
The Beginning of the Sheikh Movement 
The war brought many disasters to the local population. The productive labor force was 
conscripted to the front. After the war, the population was hit once more by famine. The poor 
harvest of 1879 brought many near starvation, with some even dying.82 In Diyarbakır, people 
held demonstrations against the lack of bread in bakeries and high prices.83 Similar 
complaints also arose in Van.84 After its defeat, many soldiers deserted the Ottoman Army. 
These deserters were forced to resort to contraband activities. The chaotic situation 
exacerbated the social unrest. Under such depressed conditions, more crime and similar 
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violations were feared. The peace was not without a price, and the taxes levied in its aftermath 
amounted to a disaster for the poverty-stricken population. Besides high inflation and scarcity 
of goods, a lack of security was another side effect of the unstable peace. 
The rebellion of the brothers Osman and Hüseyin Bedirhan can be evaluated against 
that background. An analysis of the incident is crucial for understanding the dynamics of 
Sheikh Ubeydullah’s movement and the Ottoman state’s first reaction towards it. The short-
lived movement of the two brothers just after the defeat raised alarms in the Ottoman central 
government. In 1878, these sons of the former Botan emirate fled to the region. When Osman 
arrived, he was met with 2,000 armed men. This group contained the suspects of Abidin Paşa 
and who were later interrogated by Izzet Paşa. It seemed that same group resorted to banditry, 
especially on local Christians and were mainly the same ring leaders (elebasilar) and hard-
core criminal thugs that later the government tried to bring them to law during Abidin Paşa’s 
governorship. The central government did not find the group’s numbers to be a serious 
concern. The government knew very well that such a group could be dispersed by a simple 
military maneuver.It initially sent a telegram through Siirt ordering that if the group did not 
submit when they got the message, this would be considered an act of rebellion. In his reply, 
Osman declared that he should not be treated like a rebel or bandit. He claimed that his 
followers had gathered around him merely to demonstrate their love and respect. He said had 
no choice but to stay in his native land due to both the insistence of his companions and the 
lack of anything else to do. He had just planned to visit the Cizre city and he was not there to 
instigate an armed rebellion. He emphasized that he would not hesitate to provide any 
sacrifice to his government’ adding that he had already provided many important services to 
the government but received nothing in return. He recounted that during the war, he had 
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followed Ismail Paşa’s orders in calling up 4,140 soldiers into military service and 
confronting a great common enemy. 85 
He also criticized how the old emirate system was not being applied in Kurdistan any 
more. He charged that local officers were practicing oppression, saying that in contrast he was 
attracting popular support. With some sort of government position or assignment, he said, he 
could have served the state interest better. He alluded frequently to the glory of his family and 
the desperate conditions into which he had fallen. He said he could do nothing if government 
soldiers were sent to deal with him, and he had nothing to lose. The letter’s final word – 
hukmlillah, meaning “the decision lies with God” – struck an ambiguous note, but Diyarbakır 
Governor Abdurahman Paşa took this as a clear sign of his rebellious intentions. The governor 
also interpreted a travel permit issued by Osman bearing the seal “Osman Bedirhan, Emirate 
of Bohtan” as further evidence of his evil designs. Even the reluctance of Osman’s men to cut 
the telegraph lines, so keeping the lines of communication open, was seen in the governor’s 
eyes as a ploy to buy time to consolidate their power. The central government recommended 
firmly that he be prevented from entering Cizre, fearing his already considerable influence 
would spread further. But when he entered Cizre anyway, Abdurrahman Paşa questioned him 
through a telegraph machine. The governor asked Osman Bedirhan exactly what kind of 
office he was looking for, suggesting a position in the new established Malatya district. He 
was pointing to the government at the same time that finalizing such an offer would require 
significant paperwork and should only be seen as a suggestion. Osman replied to the 
governor’s offer that he had already heard many empty promises, saying that since he knew 
shuffling the existing offices would mean some would lose their jobs, he preferred to stay in 
his homeland. His request for an office at home also found strong support among the locals.86 
The Cizre administrative council sent a signed telegram to Istanbul complaining that their 
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taxes were not only high, but also were not being collected properly, and went on to propose 
Osman Nureddin Beğ as a good candidate for carrying out the task. Meanwhile, for the 
Ottoman government, the interview with Osman had merely been a ploy to gain time. The 
necessary military units had already been dispatched from nearby towns. Three battalions 
from Mosul under the command of Said Paşa on the way to winter in Mamuratu’l Aziz would 
be added to the organized campaign. Auxiliaries conscripted from Şırnak and Midyat were 
sent on the road to Zaho in order to block any aid getting to Cizre, and another battalion from 
Mosul was ordered to set up there. From Bitlis, two battalions were sent to help two others in 
Siirt. Three reserve battalions were dispatched from Tercan and Bayburd to Muş as a reserve 
force. Soon a group of 200 men was scattered after the initial confrontation by the three 
battalions from Siirt. This ease of the dispersion could be attributed their lack of organization 
around a concrete goal.87 
At this very critical time, such a rebellion worried the central state. This showed the 
state that it could not rely on military forces being at the right place and the right time. 
Therefore the state had to rely on only regular soldiers from relatively distant cities nearby. 
Initially, there were no organized security forces on point. The reforms and petitions about 
incursions against the Christians made it difficult to resort to auxiliaries or organize new units 
from local conscripts, because the Christians’ situation was dominating the spotlight. At this 
critical point, the central state found it difficult to decide on such an important matter, though 
it would later have important repercussions. In case of a drastic decision, the international 
interest would further destabilize the empire’s already unsteady political and financial state. 
Abidin Paşa would later, while implementing British-supported reform policies, arrest the 
leaders and notables of the groups allied with the two brothers. 
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While the Ottoman state tried to gain time by questioning Osman Bedirhani, some of 
his relatives were trying to sway his course of action. Ahmed Hulusi tried to persuade him 
that he was pursuing a useless goal and that he would end up damaging the unity of the nation 
and religion. He urged him not to trust Kurds, whom he branded notorious turncoats lacking 
any sense of right and wrong. Later Bahri Beğ implored his little brother with another 
telegram reminding him of how their misguided father had followed a similar course with 
more allies, but had only been able to hold out for two days. Later their father had regretted 
his rebellious acts and advised his sons to be respectful and obey the sultan. After 
guaranteeing safety for both Osman and Hüseyin if they relented, Bahri was successful, and 
his brothers agreed to return to Istanbul. But Abdurahman Paşa was strictly against Bahri 
Beğ’s proposal to bring his two brothers back. He pointed to Bahri’s injustice towards 
Christians when he had been in the region one year earlier and his removal after many 
protests. Izzet Paşa was also against the brothers coming to Istanbul via Halep on January 25, 
1878 with a military envoy also including Bahri Beğ88 Later Bahri Beğ would again take a 
similar arbitration role in the case of Sheikh Ubeydullah. 
Osman Bedirhani also sent a letter to his relatives in Damascus through a trader,89 but 
the letter was seized and opened in Diyarbakır. In it he ordered one of his brothers, Bedri, to 
bring his mother. In his memoirs, Bedri Beğ’s nephew Mehmet Salih referred to the arrest of 
Bedri along with Mehmet’s father Mahmut Izzet Azizi.90 The Ottoman state recognized that 
Bedirhan brothers derived their power from their family ties and acted accordingly. As a state 
still dealing with its inherited imperial legal remnants and in the process of territorial 
definition, dealing on a family basis rather than an individual basis was only natural. The fact 
that the trader was entrusted with the letter and, after interrogation, confessed to carrying it 
can give a better understanding about how Osman Bedirhani may well have intended to prove 
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to the government that his principal aim was his family’s well-being alone. When Sheikh 
Ubeydullah became a rebel along with his two sons, a similar case led to a richer brew of 
attitudes in that context. The power of the state’s opponents was vested in their family ties and 
so the state held them responsible on a family basis. Using family status became a modus 
operandi at the hands of both the state and its opponents. 
After the 1293 war, new provinces and administrative centers were established due to 
land cessations. Formerly a subdivision of the Erzurum province, Van became a new province 
with Hakkari (Çolemerik) attached. Similarly Mamurat u’l Aziz was split off from Diyarbakır 
to become an independent province with Malatya and Dersim as sub-provinces. In January 
1880, when the Bitlis subdistrict of the city of Muş became a new province containing Bitlis, 
Muş, Siirt and Genç as subdistricts, the new administrative regulation was complete. By 
virtue of their holding administrative positions in these new arranged cities, it would be no 
coincidence that the region’s influential notables demanded the same positions appointed by 
the center. The case of Osman Bedirhan was a good example of just that.  
The central state had evaluated the influence of Sheikh Ubeydullah in the same 
manner as it dealt with the affair of the two brothers. In fact, by holding greater power than 
the Bedirhani sons, the sheikh was a possible threat to the center if the two became rivals. As 
recent conditions had decreased the power of the central state, they had boosted the new 
candidates for its power. The rifles thrown by fleeing soldiers of the Ottoman Army were 
already in the hands of the sheikh. Whereas Osman Nureddin Bedirhan had complained of his 
family’s fading glory during their sojourn away from their homeland, Sheikh Ubeydullah held 
a greater charisma if he turned against the Porte.  
By that point, the influence of the sheikh had already indicated a conflict with the 
central administration. In the Nestorian-inhabited regions of the Çolemerik and Herki tribes of 
the Shemdinan district, tobacco cultivation was an important source of income. All previous 
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efforts to collect taxes from this business had been to no avail. Here the government 
recognized the fact that as the region was at the border, its people were unused such orders, 
and so such a tax could only be imposed through forceful intervention. Moreover the 
Nestorian villagers openly threatened to flee if such a tax were levied on them, whereas the 
state was relatively optimistic about the loyalty of Muslim tribes.   
Including other taxes accrued over 30 years for the entire region, a total amount of 70 
loads of piaster were in arrears. When the government recognized that collecting the tobacco 
tax by itself was impossible, it delegated the responsibility to Sheikh Ubeydullah by means of 
an auction. But since the region bordered Iran, the villagers found it more profitable to sell 
their products to Iran and therefore the sheikh claimed that he had failed in his task, and the 
crop found its way to the Persian soil without a tax.91  
In 1875 the matters gained a new dimension, when the center recognized that the 
influence of Mar Shamun on the Nestorians and Ubeydullah on the tribes were in fact the 
main obstacles to assessing and collecting the tax. In light of this situation, the Van and 
Erzurum provinces suggested to the center that deporting the sheikh from the region would be 
useful. They might instead give him a suitable task around Hejaz since he was a Naqshebandi. 
This, they judged, was a better alternative than military intervention. As support for their 
argument, they also provided a letter from Sheikh Ubeydullah’s son-in-law Muhammed Emin. 
In it, he suggested to the governor of Van that deporting the sheikh would be a wise choice 
and furthermore promised to collect the accrued taxes himself. In so doing, he told of the 
failure of sheikh in his previous task, charging that Ubeydullah had collected the tobacco 
himself and sold it to Persian traders for his own benefit. This contradicted the sheikh’s 
account that he had been unable to assess and collect the tobacco tax. Muhammed Emin 
continued: 
                                                 
91 A. MKT. MHM. 480/66. 
 56 
“Since deep obedience and obeisance to the Sublime State in both deeds and words is an obligation, I write 
sincerely in saying that the agriculture of Şemdinan and Herki depends mostly on tobacco. Approximately 
100 yük and each 50 of yearly allowance are produced. And half of that which consists of 1 yük at freight of 
five belongs to Sheikh Ubeydullah himself, and the other part he buys cheaply from the people of two 
districts and then sells dearly toPersian traders. This way he prevents (kills) the application of the tax and 
does not allow it to be registered in the accounts of the sublime state. If the state does not deport him, it must 
completely forsake two districts, because God forbid he can so deceive and betray the people, but by 
deporting this the sheikh, I would promise that I can collect the taxes completely together with the sheep tax 
and tithes of barley and whatever else had resisted collection should the government assign us this task. The 
decree always belongs to the owner of the order.”92 
 
The letter, written in Persian and signed by Emin himself, was a good example how 
the government could find allies in a tribal structure. The central government could even exert 
its influence in a relatively politically free area coming out of a tax. Besides this phenomenon, 
there were other events pointing to the flexibility of tribal relations. Sheikh Ubeydullah tried 
to build a unity upon such a basis.  
The idea of deporting or removing the sheikh from his sphere was not anathema to the 
Ottoman center. In general the Ottoman Empire might be expected to apply such policies to 
those whose influence had grown problematic. But in this situation the influence of the sheikh 
was greater than an ordinary notable, and moreover this influence was more connected with 
his residential domain than was the case with others.  
Towards the end of the summer of 1879, the local tribes had a dispute with the regular 
soldiers dispatched from Mosul to the Imadiye region. The soldiers were accused of pillaging 
and violating the villagers. The soldiers had an armed confrontation with the tribes, and 
consequently a military division of the Ottoman Army was captured. The sheikh’s son, Seyit 
Abdulkadir, was also involved in the affair. The Ottoman government became very suspicious 
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about the sheikh’s intentions after this incident, especially when the empire was constantly 
under pressure for reform. The Ottoman government recognized well that the sheikh held 
enormous power at his disposal.  
The government seemed to be reluctant to have an open confrontation with the sheikh, 
yet it took the necessary steps in order to pursue the father and the son. At first the 
government urgently asked them to come together to either Van or Istanbul.93 Besides some 
arbitrators, the government officially assigned Sami Paşa from the Fourth Army to investigate 
the situation. Sheikh Rıza was also dispatched from Mosul to interview Sheikh Ubeydullah. 
When he recognized that the events of Imadiye had so excited the government’s attention, 
Ubeydullah quickly ordered his son Abdulkadir to be near him. On September 7, 1879, 
Sheikh Rıza brought with him the captives together with their captain Kamil Efendi. He 
reported that he was just there while the two sons of Ubeydullah brought the captives. The 
rebels were considering executing the soldiers as vengeance for the losses from their clashes, 
but Rıza persuaded them not to. He added that he had personally witnessed the cutting off of 
the finger of the regional state tax officer who had betrayed the sheikh by providing 
information to the governor of Van.94 Such demonstrative acts as public punishment might 
have been plays to purposely expose the sheikh. What Sheikh Rıza provided was not only an 
account of his impressions but also evidence of the degree of fear engendered by Ubeydullah. 
He claimed that the group gathered around the sheikh out of fear. Moreover, Ubeydullah was 
declaring that he would either unite Kurdistan to transform it into its former emirate status, 
like Montenegro and Serbia, or die for this cause and so save his soul. Another informant, 
Fuad Beğ, the former head of the Bradost tribe, reported that the group had already begun to 
disperse due to lack of food supplies.95  
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Such informants and the sheikh’s propensity to negotiate caused the government to lift 
the strict measures against the sheikh. Obviously the population was suffering under a great 
socioeconomic crisis after the great defeat, and harsh measures would naturally agitate them. 
The government found it better to invite the sheikh rather than compel him. Meanwhile 
Ubeydullah declared to the government that he was ready to submit his son. Events in the 
region calmed down. Taking stock of the situation, the government suddenly ordered him to 
stay in the village of Nehri rather than come to Van, as it had decided to dispatch special 
envoys and thought it might be better for him to stay put.96 Moreover, the mufti of Van and 
Sheikh Fehim, who was Ubeydullah father’s caliph, were also dispatched to the sheikh to give 
him telegrams from Istanbul.97 They were accompanied by Mehmed Said, who had been in 
Van to maintain contacts on the sheikh’s behalf. 
The sheikh claimed in his petition that his son had been around Imadiye to help 
mediate between villagers and the government and to prevent any compulsive actions. His 
enemies and foreigners were laying such accusations on his son and distorting how things had 
really happened, he charged. Free soldiers could attest that his son had saved them, he stated, 
adding his regret at Ubeydullah’s service in the war being repaid by such pursuit. He said that 
hearing of these incidents had made him very upset, so he ordered his son to come near him. 
He added that under such conditions his stay in Şemdinan had become unbearable without a 
guarantee from the Ottoman state, so he felt he had to move and settle at the border of Iran. In 
that case the whole region from Erzurum to Baghdad could erupt into turmoil. The sheikh was 
inclined to negotiate, but the minimum requirement for this was a guarantee from the 
government.98 
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The government was planning to bring Ubeydullah to Van and then persuade him to 
leave the region. Realizing the threat of the sheikh to order, the government had planned to 
send him to one of the holy cities under the pretext of a religious mission. That would in fact 
be a more rational solution than entering such a mountainous region, especially when the 
empire was militarily so weak. Therefore the government grew very careful in its attitude 
towards the sheikh. Each side showed mutual respect to the other in their written 
communications. On September 26 the envoys sent to Ubeydullah returned after giving him 
necessary assurances due to his old and longstanding obedience to the state. He was granted 
the mercy of the sultan, and the special aide-de-camps envoys established relations with the 
local tribes. After they were granted mercy the tribes renounced their rebellious acts, blaming 
them on foreign deception. A commission from Van was formed and sent to the region to 
examine their demands and investigate the related affairs of the Herki and Dostki tribes. 
These policies were effective in bringing calm to the tribes.99 
While the governor of Van had a positive attitude towards the sheikh, on September 
29 the governor of Mosul took a more critical stance towards the guarantee and negotiation 
process. He charged that Sheikh Ubeydullah had begun to spread a rumor that a major and a 
mufti of Van had been sent specially to him, giving him responsibility for the whole area. He 
had begun to say, added the governor, that the army around Imadiye would soon disperse. The 
governor further warned that the sheikh was trying to buy time by initiating negotiations. In 
addition, the ağa of Zebar was near Edhem Paşa and tried to conscript rifle units in the region, 
but the group refused his envoys. This could be interpreted that the group was still leaning 
towards rebellion.100 But the government stuck to its policy to persuade the sheikh to come 
and stay in Van. Towards that end the grandson of Ubeydullah, Mehmed Sıdık, was accepted 
as royal robe aide-de-camp because of his former services at the Beyazid frontier as miralay 
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during the war. Sheikh Ubeydullah sent one member from his family, Mehmet Said, as his 
deputy to the city of Van.101 On October 13 the sheikh’s son Abdulkadir attended the 
commission established at Gevar (Yüksekova).  
Fourth Army commander Sami Paşa dispatched Major Necip Beğ with the special 
envoys sent to the sheikh. The royal aide-de-camp Bahri Beğ was assigned with Ahmed Ratip 
Beğ to give the rewards and gratitude of the sultan.102 During the meeting, Ahmet Ratip 
received very special messages from the sheikh written and addressed to the sultan. The letter 
was signed by the sheikh and specially confided in Ahmed Beğ. The letter was dated October 
17, but seemed to reach Istanbul only after a delay since the sheikh strictly instructed Ratip 
not to give the letter to anyone besides the sultan, and even to destroy it in case of danger. 
Ahmet Ratip found the way he received the letter remarkable, thinking that the sheikh had 
acted according to the special orders received from the sultan.103 
In the letter Sheikh explained that the disorder in the cities of Van, Erzurum and Van 
was occurring due to the tribes and corrupt officials trying to take advantage of this. This 
disorder was causing unrest and even the flight of some subjects, he warned. Secondly, he 
criticized Mar Shamun, the leader of Christians in the city of Çolemerik. Although Shamun 
lacked the power to confront even a single battalion of the state, he had increased his 
oppression due to the neglect and carelessness of local officers. This aroused the local 
people’s distrust towards the government, as they watched the process culminating in an 
incident previous year when he attacked and burned 12 villages around the castle of Imadiye, 
as a result of which five Muslims were murdered and a seyid was thrown alive into the 
flames. The officials benefited from the rise of Mar Shamun at the cost of insulting Muslims 
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and fuelling Christian animosity. This provocation from the officers reached the unbearable 
level of being suffered by the local Muslims. 
Thirdly, he rejected plans for the province of Van to be annexed to Armenia, even 
though Christians formed only one-twentieth of the province’s population. Such a decision 
would be very harmful for Van’s Muslim majority and accordingly could not be accepted by 
them, he warned, excepting only 10-15 ruinous people called Timuroğlu from the town of 
Van who were notorious for their mischief. 
Fourthly, he supported the annulment of some articles of the constitution called 
“kanun-i esasi,” because he believed that all affairs of Islam should be under the direct control 
of the caliphate of Islam. 
Fifthly, he pointed to the importance of religion. He said that religious affairs having 
precedence was essential for the advancement of the state. More enthusiastic and capable 
officials should be assigned to such tasks, he recommended, and the state should be more 
concerned about religious matters. 
Sixthly, he pointed to the border problem. When foreign subjects attacked Ottoman 
subjects, military officers did not pay the necessary attention to the cases of those 
infringements, he charged, whereas Ottoman subjects’ retaliation towards foreigners was met 
by firm measures such as capture and arrest of suspects, and confiscation and return to the 
foreigners of pillage spoils. Such blindness for the interest of their subjects caused further 
discredit to the government and led to oppression, he warned. He lamented how subjects of 
the state became victims of the oppression of foreigners due to the neglect of their own 
egoistic officers. Only the governor of Van, Hasan Paşa, was exempted from this general 
pattern.  
Seventhly, he put forth for consideration the expense of his tekke (dervish lodge). The 
tekke was on Ottoman land. It had at least 5,000 piastre (kuruş) allocated for its annual daily 
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expenses, a sum met by contributions from the Iranian side. This situation was not appropriate 
for a tekke, he said, to which the sultan also belonged. His majesty’s servants could also 
witness the crowd of the tekke’s visitors and followers. 
Lastly, some of the order’s followers lived on Ottoman lands, and others in Iran. 
Those living in Iran enjoyed state support, whereas those on Ottoman land had none. Thus he 
asked that they be exempted from certain state taxes known as “tekalif-i miriye.”  
Sheikh Ubeydullah was constantly pressed to stay in Van. In order to avoid doing so, 
he provided many excuses and alternatives to each offer. On November 6 his son Abdulkadir 
came near Sami Paşa and submitted. During the autumn, the Ottoman state still maintained 
contact with the sheikh. On November 10, Ahmed Ratip moved from Van in order to deliver 
the royal decree. Sami Paşa said that the military unit had been well accepted by the public 
and the whole Hakkari region was in order. This situation was confirmed by reports from 
Mosul as well.104 Despite this good news, the sheikh refused to come to Van again, citing his 
health as an excuse. Sami Paşa argued that calling him and giving him more guarantees would 
be useless, because the seasonal conditions would better justify the sheikh’s former apologies. 
Rather he suggested postponing the same plan to the beginning of the spring. 
The winter passed relatively quietly. The Council of Ministers held a special meeting 
to consider the settlement of Kurds. The government was anxious that the incursions of Kurds 
would cause the local Christians to apply for Russian or British protection, which could 
become a serious problem in the long run. Therefore a schedule was assigned to Sami Paşa 
until the end of that summer in coordination with the commission. Moreover, the nomadic 
tribes of the border were leaning towards Iran through the recent efforts of that state, and their 
settlement was to be decided according to negotiation with the tribes’ notables and leaders. 
The Nestorian-inhabited region had the future potential to become Kurdistan’s Montenegro 
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with their bishop religious leaders recently inclined towards Tblisi, and so the government 
had to settle with these tribes with the help of Sheikh Ubeydullah’s sway after giving him 
esteem and deference. Clearly the decisions of the council were addressing some important 
issues in the sheikh’s proposals contained in his petition.105  
The commission in the region suggested that in the Humaro district, near the sheikh’s 
residence, a small settlement and barracks for a two-battalion unit should be built. It was 
decided that the plan was necessary for the district’s development and would help maintain 
order and security. The presence of a military unit would also prevent tribal thievery, where 
recent figures of sheep theft in the Hakkari district alone reached 40,000.106  
In the March of 1880 famine hit the population and drew attention to the region. 
Christian charities tried to send help to their brethren in the region. According to an Armenian 
Patriarchate petition dated May 19, the famine was increasing Kurdish incursions against 
Armenians. The government replied that an aid commission had been established for relief 
and recovery had already begun with the arrival of spring. As for the criminal allegations, the 
government declared that these could not be called abnormal, beyond the random expectance 
of such occurrences in every society. 107  
At the beginning of June, Britain was not satisfied with the proceedings of the 
Ottoman Empire in terms of implementing the reform programs. After diplomatic maneuvers, 
Britain managed to get international assent, and so gave a note to the Ottoman government 
urging it to fulfill the requirements of Article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin.108 At this critical 
turning point, bringing Sheikh Ubeydullah to Istanbul became more crucial for the 
government. Bahri Beğ met with the sheikh again on June 26. The royal aide-de-camp 
conveyed royal gratitude from the sultan and Sami Paşa gave him some orders and 
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suggestions related to then nation and state. The sheikh replied that although in recent years 
he had wished to reply to these honorable messages by coming personally to Istanbul, his 
health problems made this impossible. He noted that the messages of Bahri Beğ and his 
efforts had immense influence among the tribes and had spurred them to disregard every 
danger for the sake of the Muslims’ leader, the sultan. He said he always thought of working 
to win the favor of the sultan as one of the holiest task.109 Sheikh Ubeydullah decided to send 
his cousin and caliph to Van rather than going himself.  
As a result, Mehmet Said came to the city of Van. On July 4, Sami Paşa reported from 
Van that the sheikh had declined the invitation to Istanbul due to the intrigues against him and 
that the sheikh’s loyalty to the sultan was evident from his oath taken on the holy scriptures 
and the reports of some officers. The sheikh declared that if the demands confided in his son 
were listened to, he had already begun preparations to have Abdulkadir accompany Mehmed 
Said to Istanbul. The appointment of his cousin as a delegate to Van might be seen as a first 
step towards negotiations and the need for better communication.  
Sami Paşa met the sheikh’s deputy, who declared that all of them were determined to 
stand opposed to the Armenians being granted privileges and that they needed further 
assurance on that matter. There were rumblings that 3,000 of the 10,000 guns had arrived and 
been distributed among Nestorians and Armenians, whereas the Muslim had received not a 
one. On his return to Van, Mar Shamun saw the British and Russian consuls, but his offer of 
an independent government under his lead paying a fixed tax to the Ottomans was only 
accepted by the Russians. The sheikh privately warned Mar Shamun that in such a case he 
would issue a religious decree. 
  In reply, Sami Paşa recommended that they give up the idea of any sort of 
disturbances because the government had the power to suppress it, adding that the 
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government had never made any promises to the Nestorians or Armenians as they had 
claimed. Sami Paşa also delivered to the sheikh an ornamented box and golden watch from 
the sultan, saying that these gift and grants proved that the rumors were baseless. Mehmed 
Said also reported that the Persian shah’s letter to the sheikh was sent with a two-mule load 
gift, and that letter declared the shah’s good intentions concerning the sheikh’s lodge since it 
was established by his ancestors, warning the sheikh of Ottoman conspiracies and giving him 
permission to come and settle.  
Sami Paşa pointed to the possibility that the sheikh could be brought by giving 
guarantees. The sheikh’s reluctance and rumors about Armenians were due to provocations 
from the Persian side, which the tribal leaders took a common oath to oppose. Other than the 
last incursion by the Persian Shekak tribe, there were no problems in the region. After 
evaluating the situation, the government insisted on bringing the sheikh and making firm his 
inclination towards the Porte, besides implementing necessary measures against the Persians’ 
tribal incitement policy.110 
The case of Sheikh Ubeydullah began to attract attention of other powers besides the 
Ottoman government. On July 9 the British consul at Van went to visit Şemdinan under 
orders from the general consul who had been in Van for some time. He met Mar Shamun 
during his return.111 The more interesting note about the sheikh’s activity during this period 
comes from a report written by Russia’s consul in Van, Gamsarakan. He had been the head of 
the police force during the occupation of Erzurum and was of Armenian origin. In his report, 
he claimed that at the end of June, a general meeting had been held with the participation of 
many Kurdish leaders from a wide area. This was seen as the basis of Sheikh Ubeydullah’s 
intention to mobilize the Kurdish population around a nationalist aim.112 On July 18 the 
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sheikh used the same excuse to once again reject the call for Istanbul, and he lamented that 
there were rumors distorting his good intention towards the government, although the result of 
his four years of efforts with the vali (governor) of Van to establish the order had been 
successful. 
Finally, the sheikh gave thanks for the gifts and gratitude he had received from the 
Ottoman government and declared that he accepted the invitation and was ready to act in 
compliance with the official notifications. After this conclusion, Bahri Beğ asked for 
permission to leave, since everything was in order and a longer stay would be interpreted as 
lack of confidence.113 The long tension seemed to be calming down. 
 
The Attack on Urmiye and Sawjbulak 
 At this initial phase before the movement towards the Urmiye plain, the compromise between 
the government and the sheikh remained ambiguous. Even a simple invitation from the 
government had provided the sheikh with many opportunities for delay. Another new 
invitation or meeting offer at that moment could have been the cause of further demands from 
the sheikh. 
Meanwhile there had been new developments in Iran. The local governor of 
Sawjbulak, Lutfali Mirza, was already notorious for his abuse of local notables such as 
Feyzullah Beğ and Mina Ağa, the son of Kadir Ağa. Hamza Ağa had previously fled to 
Ottoman lands two years ago and returned to his land under an amnesty. The governor wanted 
to levy taxes on Kadir and Hamza Ağa in terms of assigning them some duties. Kadir Ağa got 
a permit to leave for his village in order to avoid this, whereas Hamza Ağa left the city 
without any such permit, despite advice to the contrary. The governor first arrested an 
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acquaintance of Kadir Ağa, who was released after negotiations. But this time a friend of 
Hamza Ağa named Aziz Ağai Fettah was arrested. Hamza Ağa decided to go to the city in 
order to release him and account for the arrears. The governor ordered him to his mansion one 
night in order to arrest him, but Hamza Ağa was also expecting such a trick. When the 
servants tried to put him in chains he stabbed them, and then snatching a rifle from one of the 
servants, he ran outside. He had his allies waiting outside, and they had clashes with the 
servants. They used the night and were able to leave the city.114 
This incident led to great discontent among the people. The governor of Sawjbulak 
asked for help from Tabriz, and Mehmet Hüseyin Man with 20 cavalries along with Mehmed 
Sadık Han of Bahtiyari and Rahim Han Çelebyanlu with 80 cavalries were sent to the city to 
arrest Hamza Ağa. The initial plan of acting together with local notables, such as Kadir Ağa 
and Feyzullah Beğ, was doomed to failure in the mountainous resort of Hamza Ağa. 
Meanwhile Hamza Ağa also resorted to collaboration with other government dissidents. He 
found good allies among his nephew Suwar Ağa of the Zudi tribe and Mamend Ağa of the 
Piran. These two tribes were near the Ottoman border. In the beginning his brother Kakallah 
adopted a precautionary policy of neutrality in order not to lose complete control over the 
Mengur tribe if they were unable to confront the Persian Army. The previous governor of 
Urmiye, Şehzade Ahmed Mirza, had seriously oppressed Abdullhah Han and Ibrahim Han in 
Ushnu. These two brothers were disciples of Sheikh Ubeydullah and leaders of the Zirza tribe. 
They had already tried to get help in their former search for compensation that ended in vain. 
But the most important ally of Hamza Ağa would be Sheikh Ubeydullah. He went to ask his 
help with one of the sheikh’s deputies named Kemal.115  
On September 21, 1880, Sheikh Abdulkadir went to Ushnu with Hamza Ağa. Hearing 
of the incident, the Piran, Mangur and Aku tribes also joined them. In his letter to the leader 
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of the Balek tribe of Revanduz, Abdulkadir declared that their presence there was due to the 
advancement of religion and demanded that they contribute to the movement by joining. 
Since Hamza knew the region better, he got a leading position in the movement. During the 
movement, he was at the helm with Abdulkadir.116 With the news that the sheikh would be 
involved in the affair and had begun to gather men for an offense, a great panic in Sawjbulak 
ensued, and on September 29 they entered the city which the local governor had fled just two 
days earlier. They delivered a sermon during the Friday mosque prayers intoning the name of 
Abdulhamid as the caliph and cursing the cruelty of Persian officials.117 
The remaining tribes of the Mukriyan region took stock of the situation and acted 
bilaterally. For example, Mehmed Ağa of the Mameş tribe had a dispute with the sheikh over 
the control of Ushnu, which had been recently left to Sheikh Ubeydullah, disparaging his 
privileges there. When the extent of the sheikh’s power became evident as well as the fact that 
the Karapapak tribe was being subjected to plunder because they confronted the sheikh, 
Mehmed Ağa decided to join the forces of the sheikh. Yet throughout the movement, he 
sought out every opportunity to desert as well as avoid tribal levies. Kadir Ağa, however, 
supplies the best example of pretense, as he hesitated from openly declaring sides, although 
his son Mina Ağa participated actively. In the end, he tried to save his property from the 
plunder and revenge of the Persian Army. Through his tacit understanding with Hamza Ağa, 
from the very beginning he grabbed at taking every advantage from the movement. Gulabi 
Ağa of the Dehbokri tribe was against the movement, but he had to conceal his intentions for 
a time. Osman Ağa of the Gavirg tribe in the Serdesht region participated in the movement 
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after the Mianduab incident, and even then with much reluctance when a more accurate 
balance of power appeared. 
Sheikh Abdulkadir settled his encampment in the city for a few days and according to 
Quryans, his first intention was to attack the lands of Afşar and Saqez. But a cry for help from 
the Kurdish villagers of Meraga in the direction of Mianduab led him to send some cavalries 
to Merhamedabad. His uncle was killed in skirmishes with cavalries of Mehmet Huseyin Han 
of Bahtiyar, Selim Han of Çarduli and Ali Han of Meraga. With the appearance of forces 
from Sawjbulak, they retreated to the Castle of Mianduab that contained a little artillery and 
some soldiers. After three hours of struggle, Celil Ağa (the brother of Han Babacan) passed to 
the Kurds’ side by burning the city bazaar on the night of October 1, a Friday, causing great 
plunder and a massacre of civilians in Mianduab, leaving 800 Muslims, 20 Armenians and 50 
Jews dead in the city, according to Quryans.118 Due to a lack of provisions, the tribal leaders 
resorted to pillage to devastating ends. Interestingly, they were unable to use the cannon that 
they got from Mianduab. On October 12, the group left Mianduab in ruins and moved on to 
Benab, and on October 17, they arrived in Malek Kandi119 The events of Mianduab soon 
aroused a reaction among the Shiite majority of Iran. A Persian army under the command of 
Itimadu‘s-Saltane moved from Tabriz towards Meraga, and a second army under the 
command of Hamza Mirza Haşmetu’d-Devle moved from Tehran on October 14.120 
The extent of looting demonstrated the nature of tribal warfare, although there might 
have been some runaway Ottoman soldiers from their rows at the border.121 Once each tribe 
                                                 
118 Quryans, p. 41. He gives the casualty figures on p. 43. 
119 “… with a number of 8,000 cavalries and 9,000 infantries. The others that gathered with the expectation of 
plunder were not less than 10,000” (p. 57). Quryans seemed to exaggerate the numbers in order to make the 
Persian victory dearer. Although he had prejudices, his work supplies valuable information. That can be inferred 
also his stress of Friday night. He always stressed the futility of the sheikh’s arguments and hatred of the Shiites.  
120 Y. PRK. ASK. 4/54, 4/65, 4/67. 
121 Y. PRK. ASK. 4/72. On November 6, Sami Paşa reported there might be participants from the army though 
they were not permitted. There had been significant numbers from Ottoman tribes in the movement, and mainly 
the nucleus of the group around Abdulkadir was composed of former auxiliary veterans of the Ottoman- Russian 
War, which Quryans called “qarapuşek” for their wearing black garb. Therefore the commander Sami Paşa 
advised the government that soldiers not to be conscripted from the border regions. 
 70 
took its share of the plunder, the need for continued fighting evaporated for them. They soon 
dispersed. As for the legitimization of their acts, they had the religious decree of the mufti of 
Sawjbulak that permitted taking spoils from unbelievers. Moreover, the desperate socio-
economic conditions motivated such acts. Most of the loyal tribal units of the group were also 
geographically close to the sheikh’s resort and thus under his influence. The lack of 
ammunition and medical care for wounds also made quick retreat strategically advantageous. 
Looting incidents increasingly appeared around the towns of Benab and Meraga. Their 
effects were felt as far as even in front of Tabriz. When 55 infantries and five horsemen of the 
Mengur tribe were plundering the villages of Meraga, the soldiers of Meraga caught them and 
killed them all, excepting only four. Then Sheikh Abdulkadir ordered an encampment around 
the Kehrize Bazaar three kilometers from Benab. After stalemate skirmishes that lasted 10 
days, the Kurds lost 300 men when the defenders used cannons. Abdulkadir retreated to 
Malek Kandi and stayed there for two days. From there he went to Çelik on November 3. 
There, due to insufficient food supplies, he decided to set some forces free and ordered most 
of them to go and join with the forces of his father at Urmiye. Many found this occasion a 
good opportunity to desert. 
The army from Tabriz under the command of Hasan Ali Han then arrived in Meraga. 
Meanwhile, 500 voluntary cavalries from Shahseven under the command of Ferdi Han and 
Necefkuli Yurtçi arrived from Tabriz in order to join the main part of the army. They 
plundered en route (Kızılcan, Kuşkulan and Refvan were sacked). When they reached Çelik, 
Itimad Saltane refused their offer to pursue Abdulkadir , because he realized that it would be a 
further pretext for looting.  
Afterwards the excesses of the Persian Army far surpassed the turmoil caused by the 
tribes. In this chaos, even neutral figures and supporters of the Persian government were not 
exempt from the damages of the army. Sheikh Abdulkadir stayed at Sawjbulak for a few more 
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days, and when he realized that the tribes would not be returning, he retreated towards Ushnu 
with the remaining 400-500 cavalries. He and Hamza Ağa also took some refugees with them 
to get shelter around Ushnu and Saqez. 
On October 11 the Deputy Caliph Said and the sheikh’s cousin Mehmed Emin came to 
Ismail Castle 9 kilometers from the city of Urmiye with 4,000 conscripted cavalries and 
infantries from the Bradost region. The town Mayor Ikbal u’d Devle confronted them by 
settling in the Bedirbu.122 Mehmed Said attacked the Kavilan and six nearby villages, and 
Christian villagers of the region ran to the city fearing a repeat of Mianduab. During an attack 
on the castle, Kurds were able to capture two cannons that however they were unable to use 
due to lack of ammunition. The army of Ikbal u’d Devle got pinned down in the castle but the 
nephew of Timur Paşa, who was patrolling between the city and castle, came to help with six 
squads from the Khoy regiment. On October 18, Sheikh Ubeydullah also came to Urmiye 
with 3,000 cavalries and infantries whom he collected among the tribes of Herki, Zirza, 
Deştbil and from the Mergever region of his influence. He encamped in the village of Saint 
Serkis at Mt. Sir situated three kilometer south of the city. This village was the summer 
residence of American missionaries. From there, he immediately sent a letter to the religious 
authorities of the town (Seyh u’l Islam and Muçtehid), telling them if they handed over the 
city peacefully, they would be spared. The city dwellers asked for a two-day delay, and this 
was accepted. The following day the Catholic Bishop Clozel sent an envoy to ensure the 
security of Christians. The Ottoman consulate representative took his brother Hoca Davud and 
Solomon the preacher with him. Here important words were exchanged between the sides. 
When the Ottoman consul introduced himself, he replied that the Ottoman and Persian state 
                                                 
122 The editor of Quryans’ book points out that there is no Castle ‘Bedirbu’ or ‘Bedirbud’ Y. PRK. ASK. 7/34.  
Sami Paşa telegram dated November 2 describes the Bendi Valley as the meeting place of the sheikh, and from 
there they moved together with 6,000 soldiers. The governor attacked Mehmed Said when they were around 
Çenize Castle with four regiments and 800 cavalries with three batteries, and lost two of them. After two hours 
of skirmishes, the governor retreated to the Bedirbu ruins. When he could not protect himself, after two more 
days he retreated back to the city and closed the gates. The sheikh then laid siege to the city with 12,000 men.  
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were spoiled and their once-glorious names fading and that hereafter, there would be no need 
for consul, vizier or governor and he would conquer the two Sultanates. Then he showed 
some men around him, saying, “Look at these people! Each is noble and clever and used to 
own an estate. Now they were so oppressed at the hand of the Ottomans that they can no 
longer be called human, but rather animals. There will not be such oppression under our 
government. I hope that after I put the lands in Iran into order, I will turn to the Ottomans and 
defeat them. When I control the whole of Iran and Turan, I will establish an order so that 
everyone is at peace.” 123 
The sheikh knew the city’s hope was to delay so as to buy time for help from Timur 
Paşa at Khoy, as he had captured some messengers from the city, so he refused their proposal 
for another three-day deferment. He stipulated again his former conditions under which the 
Christians would also be safe. If the people of the city would not tie up Ikbalu’d Devle and 
send him to the sheikh, Ubeydullah would attack the following day. 
On October 23, the ceasefire granted to the city ended. The sheikh and his elder son 
Sıddık and his caliph attacked the city from the west gates, Askerhan, for three days. Some 
300 men, mostly civilians from the city, died. The British consul from Tabriz, Abbot, was in 
the city for his summer vacation. He had planned to visit thermal springs of Tblisi to allay his 
wife’s illness. He decided to spend a few more days in Urmiye due to its good climate. He 
went to see the sheikh and asked for another delay or at least permission for the Christians to 
leave safely, because they were in the dangerous part of the city most affected by the clashes. 
His stay there had already caused rumors that he was collaborating with the aggressors. So 
when he was returning to the city together with the Armenian Simon in order to deliver the 
sheikh’s messages and arrange for passage for Christians, he was targeted by shots from 
within the city. As his situation appeared insecure, he was sent to Sawjbulak via Salduz, 
                                                 
123 Y. A. Res. 10 /3 (18) April 6, 1881. The Ottoman consulate representative told about his interview with the 
sheikh in his letter contained in this file. Quryans, p. 98.  
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because the Khoy road was not safe either. On October 31, he met with Sheikh Abdulkadir, 
who escorted him with 150 cavalries until Gerdereş 12 kilometers from Benab.124 
The sheikh shifted position and began to attack the city from the Garden of Dilguşa. 
The battle remained inconclusive, with the defenders using cannons, and the sheikh’s elder 
son was wounded. He retreated to Mt. Sir. Meanwhile, 500 loads of ammunition reached the 
city and boosted the defenders’ morale. A 15-day stalemate then ensued. Timur Paşa came 
with six divisions, 2,000 cavalries and six cannons from Khoy. He was situated 36 kilometers 
from the city and not making haste because he had a history of conflicts with the Ikbal u’d 
Devle. Sheikh Ubeydullah confronted him by sending 500 men with 30 camel loads of 
artillery under the command of his elder son, but Timur Paşa was able to check the retreat of 
Sheikh Sıddık. He was able to reach and settle at the north of the city. After then only small 
skirmishes occurred, such as one at the village of Askerabad. While the sheikh was trying to 
move to Ismail Castle the local villagers attempted an ambush. This venture was doomed to 
failure because there was no help available from Timur Paşa. Another clash occurred when 
the sheikh attacked the village of Çarbaş where Timur Paşa was encamped. The resulting 
clashes extended until Aluce, a village three kilometers from the city. For a time there was a 
stalemate between the sides. On November 11, the group disappeared and emerged again in 
Bradost two days later. There the group around him dispersed. The sheikh was ill, so he 
stayed at the Dir Monastery for a half hour and then moved towards his region Mergever. In 
his letter, the Ottoman Consulate representative reported that either the sheikh had returned to 
Nehri or stayed between the borders out of fear of the Ottomans. He added that illness was 
preventing the sheikh from eating or sitting.125 Timur Paşa continued to commit injustices 
indiscriminately towards local people. The government, in order to get rid of his nearby 
                                                 
124 Quryans, p. 68.  
125 Y. A. Res 10/3 (17,18) and Quryans leaves his report of sheikh’s until his retreat towards Bradost region. Y. 
PRK. ASK...5/31. On December 9, Nafiz Paşa reported that the sheikh had rheumatism of the knee and he was 
resting at his home, and his son Abdulkadir was protecting the grain stored at Merge. 
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excesses far exceeding those of the Kurds, paid lip service to sacking faraway villages at 
Mergever under the pretext of pursuing the sheikh. His hatred towards the locals was due to 
his punishment by former Governor Sucau’d Devle.126 
The Ottoman state retaliated at the turmoil on the Iranian side with measures of martial 
law, whereas the official declaration of the situation was suspended and given to the disposal 
of the Fourth Army. If a large army were sent to settle the border, the Bosnia-Herzegovina 
crisis was a good model for the powers to assert their influence. Moreover, Persia officially 
declared that the offenses of the sheikh should be prevented by the Ottomans, otherwise the 
necessary permission should be given to pursue him and any responsibility for a possible 
border violation by the Persian Army should be assumed by Van’s governor. The state was 
very sensitive on not causing disorder on the border. At first it tried to provide the required 
grain and cash for the dispatched army from local supplies. But the poverty-stricken 
population made this alternative unavailable, so the Ministry of Finance had to bear the 
burden. Although the state acknowledged the possibility of still persuading the sheikh, there 
were serious reports about his acts. On October 12, Sami Paşa sent a telegram giving an 
account of the sheik’s affair. He said that the sheikh had gathered in excess of 8,000-10,000 
men in the Ushnu district, which he collected from the districts around Gevar and among 
Persian tribes on the other side of the border, and by sending letters, he told of his attack on 
Sawjbulak and Urmiye and asked armed men from the local notables and ağas. Accordingly, 
Abdullah Ağa from Seydanli and Izettin from the Albak district separately gathered some men 
to go immediately, and the sheikh’s caliph Said also came to Hervati and gathered men. In the 
Geviç region of Colemerik, in the Albak districts, the residents of Masru and Siverkan made 
open alliance with the sheikh, and Ishar and other places also made common cause with him. 
Although there were rumors that the sheikh would openly attack Persian lands and punish Ali 
                                                 
126 Y. A. Res 10/3 (16) and also Quryans. 
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Han of the Şikak tribe for his raids on Ottoman tribes, Sami Paşa said that his real aim was to 
control the Ottoman side and so the need to send more troops would be urgent if no solution 
emerged in Iran. More crucially, since the sheikh had great influence, a possible invitation of 
tribes would cause grave turmoil on the Ottoman side. In order to prevent this, and to head off 
people crossing the border to help the sheikh’s movement in Iran, military strength was 
boosted in the Rewanduz and Hakkari districts, and two detachments of mountain artillery 
and a battalion under the command of Miralay Ali Şefik were dispatched to Gevar. Musa 
Paşa, the commander of the Eighth Division, with two battalions and a battalion of soldiers in 
Erciş was immediately sent to Hakkari. Two battalions were also requested from Fourth Army 
headquarters. A regiment of soldiers from the Seventh Division was prepared to be ready for 
rapid deployment, and the same was ordered from the Şehrizur headquarters at Revanduz.127 
On October 19, Sami Paşa reported that the insurgents consisted of three branches. 
One was on the move towards Tabriz under the command of Sheikh Abdulkadir, and they 
were around Merhamedabad. The second was under the command of the elder son Mehmet 
Sıddık around Mergever en route to Urmiye with the consent of the Urmiye people, and the 
remainder was in retreat under Abdulkadir to Somai in order to secure the grain stores and 
hold back a Persian offense. This reserve might join with the group in Urmiye and go onto 
Tabriz. The Ottoman Consulate in Tehran notified the commander Sami Paşa that the 
deployment of the Persian Army was insufficient. Sami explained his fears that the sheikh’s 
real aim was to establish an independent Kurdish government, and since the sheikh 
understood that he could not realize his aim in Ottoman lands, he was using Hamza Ağa’s 
case as a pretext for his offense. If the Persian Army could not cope with them even with all 
power, then his government would settle. Next with the power he had acquired, he would 
                                                 
127 Y. A. Res. 8/7. 
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increase his influence and even if he did not demand Ottoman lands, it would be natural for 
people near the border to cross to his side due to their ethnicity.128  
The state consulted a military committee which included former commander Muhtar 
Paşa and Ahmed Ratip. On the issue of how to deal with the sheikh, they recommended his 
removal from the region for several reasons, mainly due to the former policies of the Iranian 
state. In order to compel the sheikh to its side, the Persian government for a time followed a 
process of cutting the incomes of his foundations situated on the Persian side, and then they 
granted Persian citizenship to first the elder son and then the younger. By gradually granting 
them such favors in order to win their favor, the ultimate aim was to make them fear the 
Ottomans and cause the sheikh to flee due to a possible Ottoman military operation on 
Hakkari.129 Despite the constant damage from the Persian side, in a letter the shah tried to 
create just the opposite by personally asking the sultan to send his army to the border. The 
reply to his request was an assurance that the Ottoman tribes would be prevented from joining 
the insurgency along with information on military proceedings on the issue.130  
In addition to other necessary steps, the general military inspector Asaf Paşa was 
assigned to the region in order to delay the instructions and directions from getting to 
provincial administrators and tribal leaders so as to prevent their participation.131 
Initially the Ottoman state considered the situation an ordinary border violation, and 
there were no serious suspicions about the sheikh’s loyalty. Even the previous reports of 
Van’s governor saying that the sheikh shied away from his sons’ acts and had gone to Urmiye 
in order to dispel the participation of Ottoman subject when he found suddenly himself in 
                                                 
128 Y. PRK. ASK. 3/72. 
129 October 16, Y. PRK. BŞK. 3/64. 
130 Kajarian Documents on Persian and Ottoman Relations, document #574, p. 642. 
131 16 October, Y.A.Res. 8/9. 
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skirmishes were taken for granted. Soon the extent of the incidents became clearer through the 
protests of Iran and other reports. 132  
The first remarks that the sheikh had begun to gather men were interpreted that he 
would move towards Imadiye, as did the governor of Akra, who reported that the men of 
Sheikh Abdulkadir had stolen the sheep of another local sheikh, Mehmed. The fact that the 
sheikh had established connections with foreigners and that he was provoking and leading the 
movement had more serious consequences than his attacks on the Muzuri and Gerdi tribes of 
Semdinan just a few weeks before the Urmiye incidents.133 When the incidents’ impact began 
to be felt, the Ottoman government had to reach a political decision that would not harm its 
international balance. When the Ottomans understood that the incidents were more 
widespread and defeat of the sheikh more likely, the 10 infantry battalions were supplemented 
by a cavalry regiment and a canon battery, and the border officers responsible for the incident 
were reassigned.134 The governor of Van was discharged, but his cooperation was found 
necessary for the critical interim and due to the importance of the affairs a stronger and more 
intelligent commander, Mehmet Nafiz Paşa, was appointed commander of the Fourth Army in 
place of Sami Paşa.135 
The Ottoman government viewed the situation as a threat to the recent unfortunate 
conditions since the war. Therefore it mainly aimed to stabilize the border and prevent the 
sheikh from using his influence among the tribes to derail Ottoman-Persian relations. The 
state recognized that the possibility of prolonged border chaos could spur Great Britain or 
Russia to interfere to the Ottomans’ detriment. An interesting and significant remark was the 
Ottoman concern about the Armenians living in the region. The state acknowledged and tried 
                                                 
132 Y.A.Res 8/23 November 5, Y PRK. AZJ... 4/12. A petition from the sheikh for his purpose to be in Urmiye 
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Erzincan; Nafiz Paşa pointed the seriousness of the sheikh’s case and the need to send 2,500 soldiers with more 
condensed battalions.  
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to prevent the possibility of the sheikh’s influence turning against the Armenians or the 
existing disorder harming them. With respect to charges that the sheikh would turn against the 
Ottoman state and allegations of his correspondence with foreign embassies, the government 
decided that even if true, these rumors would need no solution other than getting rid of the 
sheikh. Muhtar Paşa and Ismail Beğ were even nominated for this task. These allegations had 
to be checked against Persian propaganda aimed at making the Ottomans take harsher 
measures against the sheikh and the rebels.  
Ottoman Ambassador Fahri Beğ said that the content of the letters delivered via Dr. 
Cochran and their seals were both inconsistent with the sheikh having sent them. He 
suggested that there might be a foreign intrigue involved in the sheikh’s declaration of 
independence. The letters sent to Ikbal Devle remained ambiguous and inconsistent. The 
sheikh’s interview with the British consulate had alarmed the government. When the 
consulate could not return to the city, the sheikh got written recognition from the consulate so 
that blame for any slaughter of the Christians by the town governor would not fall on the 
Kurds.136  
It was decided that the royal aide Ahmed Ratip would be sent for a better evaluation of 
the situation and to deliver suggestions to the sheikh. In order to obtain the sheikh’s content, 
the government had to reconsider and conclude his demands after the incidents at Imadiye. 
Most of them were related to government issues so they were rejected, because they would 
have increased his already challenging influence. His suggestion that Seydan (descendants of 
the Prophet) be tax exempt was a non-starter, since it was contrary to the non-discriminatory 
principles of Tanzimatt; the government could give aid only to those in desperate need. He 
had also asked for the taxation of Nestorians on the same terms as Muslims and for a sales tax 
                                                 
136 Y. PRK.. ASK... 4/79 November 9. Sami Paşa immediately sent some officials to the sheikh about the 
interview of the consulate. In Y. A. Hus 165/178, the Tehran consulate gave information about the involvement 
in delivering the letter of Rıza Beğ, who had visited Tehran the previous year to request the sheikh’s acceptance 
of Persian subjects.  
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exemption on salt from Iran. The government decided that the sheikh should act in line with 
his status by not intervening or suggesting the removal of corrupt official such as the Timur 
Pasazade family in Van or generally appointing better officials. The government also wanted 
efficient officials, but there was no serious failure of the Timur family in Van. Ahmed Ratip 
returned to Hakkari with a 5,000-piastre annual allowance and some other privileges for his 
tekye, which had already been granted with his promises that the Herki incursions would be 
stopped by preventing such border crossings and that proven wounded war veterans would 
also receive salary grants.137  
The royal aide reached Van but was unable to reach the sheikh’s resort due to winter 
conditions. His first interview with the sheikh’s deputy, Said, confirmed the sheikh’s loyalty 
and the events caused by Persian hostility against the Sunnis. In a letter left with the governor 
of Van, the sheikh stressed that the Persians’ oppression of Sunnis had reached unbearable 
levels and sown feelings of great contempt. He did not deny his involvement in the affair in 
which the conditions prevented him from complying with the sultan’s orders. He issued a plea 
about Persian injustices and left the disputed villages to the sultan’s control.138 Iran repressed 
the insurgency harshly, causing many civilians to cross to the Ottoman side. Iran ceaselessly 
asked for their return and advised the arrest of the sheikh and other Ottoman instigators. But 
the Ottoman state accepted them as refugees and tried to disarm them, telling the Persians that 
the problem should be solved by a general amnesty, and a commission should be established 
to look into crimes and damages.139  
On December 23, Iran declared a general amnesty and asked the Ottoman government 
to expel the sheikh from its borders. The amnesty was ineffective against the ongoing 
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punishment of civilians. Even some paths of return were not spared. Winter conditions made 
any military operation impossible, but it was obvious that the refugees would attack again at 
the beginning of spring. In this case Iran implied that it would seek the help of Russia. There 
was already information that Russia was sending some troops towards Nakhichevan. 
Diplomatic relations between the two states held at that point until spring. The Ottoman 
government decided to bring the sheikh to Istanbul and settle the armed tribes in areas 
relatively farther away from the border. The Ottoman government was very sensitive that 
solutions reached on the basis of a committee between two Muslim countries not allow 
interference by outside powers.140 
During the winter, the refugees were making preparations to attack come spring. Some 
60 men fled from the regiments, and by enlisting other former colleagues they reached 100 
and began to perform military exercises. There were also other hints that refugees planned to 
transform themselves into a military order by buying uniforms, horses and guns. In February, 
Hamza Ağa attacked Karapapak cavalries and killed at least 100. Some tribes, however, such 
as the Gerdi and Bradost, declared that they refused the sheikh’s leadership and even stole his 
elder son’s sheep. The sheikh told the Van administration that he would not go with the 
refugees but also that he could not prevent their attack in spring. The Van administration 
interpreted this to mean that Abdulkadir would lead the refugees, and unless the Persian 
government would guarantee their safe return, they would again resort to insurgency. At 
Imadiye, the sheikh sent some envoys to Berfire and Rikan, announcing that tithes would be 
eliminated there. On March 23, another letter of the sheikh was intercepted, one declaring 
holy war against the Persians and asking the Erciş people (i.e. those living in Erciş district of 
Van province) to prepare and join their brothers. In order to blunt the affect of these letters, 
                                                 
140 166/38 Y.A. Hus. and 166/41,  Y. A. Res 9/61 Russia sent 10 regiments and two batteries on December 26. 
Y.A. Hus. 166/42, January 24, the shah declared that he would reluctantly collaborate with Russia if he got no 
guarantee from the Ottomans. 
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the government ordered the Fourth Army and responsible governors to issue and deliver 
decrees denying the sheikh’s claims. 
The government’s plans to disarm the tribes and their settlement inside the Bradost 
region were inapplicable, because the region contained more enemies than their kin. The 
refugees mostly settled around Merge and Ranya. They were accepted as refugees if they 
surrendered their guns; therefore, gun bearers remained at the Persian side of the border. They 
were to be sent to areas farther from the border in order to isolate them from provocation. The 
royal aide Ahmed Ratip tried to persuade them to stay calm.141  
Meanwhile Iran began to increase its diplomatic pressure on the Ottomans to convince 
them that key signs still showed the sheikh instigating the tribes against Iran, yet the 
Ottomans did not proceed on their guarantees or deport the sheikh. The government rejected 
the Persian claims that the sheikh was being supported by the state on purpose. Iran began to 
declare more openly that Russia would contribute militarily to preserving the Persian borders. 
With the beginning of March, the Persian Army declared that it would mobilize under its old 
commanders and begin the attack on the Persian New Year, Nevruz. Russia also mobilized 
soldiers towards Nakhichevan.142 Iran gradually assured the Ottomans that foreign 
intervention for a solution should be sought after a certain timeframe, even though it 
considered this undesirable.143 Russia held the same view as Iran about the sheikh, and 
officially declared to the Ottoman government that it would pursue the sheikh’s case 
seriously.144  
                                                 
141 Y. A. Res. 10/3, a February 28 telegram from the governor of Mosul said that a letter of Sheikh Ubeydullah 
had been intercepted, informing tribal leaders that their meeting with Ahmed Beğ was satisfactory and that all 
the foreign governments gave rights to Kurdistan and found Iran illegitimate and that the union should not be 
damaged. Y.PRK. ASK.. 6/25, On April 20 Nafiz Paşa informed about the content of the letter written in Persian 
so that it could be evaluated by the government, Y.A.Hus 167/42. A. MKT MHM 486/62 On April 17 the 
government rejected the Persian claims and ordered the issue of a decree refusing them. 
142 Russia sent soldiers towards Nakhichevan, and figures for the mobilized Persian Army are given in Y. Res. 
10/10, March 8.  
143 Y. EE. 82/6, Y. A. Res. 10/ 3,, Y. PRK. HR. 5/63, Y. A. Res 10/2 April 8, HR SYS 82/46, Y.A.Res 10/19.  
144 Y.A. Res 10/26,. On March 30, the government decided to remove the sheikh after considering of a possible 
Russian intervention. 
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The state recognized that the sheikh couldn’t be gotten rid by force alone; rather, his 
influence among the tribes had to be included in any solution. The Ottomans initially sought 
the arbitrariness of a committee in which refugees’ problem would be solved, but later the 
sheikh’s plans for a new uprising and Russian overtures towards Persia made this unfeasible. 
The state had tried to get concessions from Iran through a committee, in order to compensate 
the refugees and compel some hardliners to settle at places distant from the border. Although 
the Ottomans openly declared that the borderline would be established on its part, the means 
was not clearly stipulated. A solution in favor of Ottoman benefits required both coordination 
from the sheikh and the consent of the tribes. Iran strictly insisted on removal of the sheikh 
and the return of criminals. They were given guarantees about the deportation of the sheikh 
and told how the issue was proceeding as proof of their serious intentions. When the 
invitation of the sheikh to Istanbul was heard, Iran still worried whether the sons of the sheikh 
would also be deported.  
Moreover, the correspondence of the royal aide showed that the sheikh was reluctant 
to obey the sultan’s invitation. The state became increasingly sure that the sheikh was 
instigating the tribes against Iran behind the scenes. It became clear that guarantees about 
preserving the border could not be established without removing the sheikh. The Persian 
ambassador hammered on the sheikh issue constantly, and his Russian colleague helped him 
to get the concern of other embassies as well.145  
At last it was reported that Sheikh Ubeydullah had deceived the government by his 
offer of border guarantees, while he was really just trying to buy time in order to provoke the 
tribes. He was ordered to come to Istanbul or more severe measures would be implemented 
against him. The sheikh replied to the official order by denying the accusations. He claimed 
that he had actually prevented the plunder of Urmiye. If he had had such aims, he would have 
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already had that opportunity when the consulate and the notables of the city were near him, he 
said. His meeting with the consulate was for the purpose of arranging his secure travel to 
Tabriz, he asserted, denying foreign inspiration. The British consulate in Tabriz could attest to 
his common sense. He swore that he did not have such slanderous aims, calling the letters 
forgeries and frauds. He promised the security of the border again if it was necessary for the 
benefit of the state, but expressed bewilderment at why he should accept Shiite oppression.146 
The new Fourth Army commander, Nafiz Paşa, arrived in Şemdinan on May 31. The 
sheikh agreed to come Istanbul, but his two sons refused. They moved to Van via Gevar, and 
they reached Van on 11 June. Nafiz Paşa did not believe the claims of illness of Sheikh 
Abdulkadir, who did not meet him. Nafiz noted that the elder son Sıddık had not met with his 
father for eight months due to resentment between them. Sıddık was busy moving half of his 
household to Iranian lands with plans to move the other part after his brother recovered. The 
commander interpreted this as a threat of his leaning towards Iran. Sheikh Sıddık was not as 
effective as his brother. The brothers could not play the same role as their father and this was 
especially so when their father was in the hands of the government. The eight divisions of 
Musa Paşa had already been left in Gevar in case their deployment became urgent, and it was 
useful to postpone their dispatch until the sheikh reached Istanbul. The sheikh also guaranteed 
that his sons would not react. Moreover, 16 regiments of soldiers were redeployed, with a 
considerable number staying in the region even after the sheikh left. The sheikh was to move 
to Istanbul on July 4 with a group of his disciples and caliphates escorted by Ahmed Ratip and 
Süleyman Paşa.  
 
Escape from Istanbul 
                                                 
146 Y.PRK. ASK. 7/55, April 29, Telegram from Nafiz Paşa and translation of the sheikh’s reply. Nazmi Paşa’s 
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After staying in Istanbul for a year, Sheikh Ubeydullah decided to leave on July 23, 1882. 
When the government recognized his unexpected departure nearly a month later, his caliph 
Mehmed Said and a Persian refugee accompanying him were interrogated by a special 
commission. At first they denied knowing anything about his departure, but after three days 
Said said that the sheikh had gone towards Batum by steamer with the help of someone called 
Kurd Ahmed Efendi. Said seemed to have been left in charge of the sheikh’s affairs with an 
explanation of his intentions.147 
The commission inferred from the last interview between the sheikh and his cousin 
that he would go and wait at his home for a decision for his deportation. He had already been 
in Istanbul for one year and his petitions remained unanswered. He declared that he had 
preferred any place in the vast Ottoman lands but had received no answer. He was glad to 
meet the sultan, but the compulsive conditions prevented his obeying by staying longer. In 
general, he regretted that Persia had not compensated for the damages committed against his 
property and that the Ottomans had not pressed on this matter. These points were clearer in 
the petition he had left one year ago. In his letter, he stressed that among the Nestorians and 
Armenians in the region, the Kurds were the most loyal subjects of the empire. But as they 
were from the Sunni sect, they were grievously oppressed by Iran as if to make them turn 
Shiite like the “Kelhur”s and “Lor”s. Recently, the Persian had increased their oppression to 
unbearable levels, and so his lodge became the main target. The Urmiye governor attacked his 
villages, killing 48 and causing 50,000 liras in damage worth. He had sought his rights 
through a commission established by the Ottoman Consulate in Tabriz. Although he was 
obviously in the right, everything remained in vain. The recent Urmiye incident was the 
outcome of such Persian policies and especially their support for the continuation of the 
                                                 
147 Y. PRK. ZB. 2/14. On August 19, 1882, the commission took Mehmed Said’s testimony and Y. PRK. KOM. 
3/65, August 20. When the government learned of the departure, it bolstered security around another candidate 
for escape, the mufti of Taşlıca, Y. PRK. A… 3/46, August 16 his 5,000 kuruş allowance was to be cut. Y. 
PRK..KOM. 3/66. 
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excesses of Ali Han Şikak on Van. He prevented any looting in Urmiye when the clashes 
began. He also declared that despite his submission, the Persians had not ended their 
hypocrisy. By continuing such tricks, they successful in deceiving some 100 destitute Bradost 
tribesmen to go and settle on his lands during his absence. He had already sowed those lands 
with seeds totaling 8,500 loads.148 In autumn, he filed another petition when Persian soldiers 
attacked 15 of his villages. At that time, he asked for a permit to go and settle either in Mosul 
or in Van, before the winter season, in order to prevent further damage.149 
Just after the interrogation ended, Sheikh Ubeydullah appeared around Van. He 
arrived there from a long route through Poti, Gümrü and Kars. In Eleskird, one of his 
deputies, Abdulsamed, and the other notables met him. The group around him climbed to 
4,000, and he acted as if his return had been permitted in order to gather soldiers for the 
looming Egypt crisis.150 When he reached the village of Şikafti on the Persian side of the 
border near Başkale on August 17, he had already collected a group of 5,000-6,000 men. A 
group of Ottoman soldiers were immediately dispatched from the Hakkari province to bring 
him back. But when it was realized their numbers were insufficient, supplementary forces 
were called up.151 
In contrast to its previous reluctance, the government now responded to the sheikh’s 
actions more quickly. All nearby military forces were sent to Başkale, and all officials around 
the region were informed about the incident for coordination. The Fourth Army command 
mobilized two infantries and a cavalry regiment from Erzurum, one regiment from Bitlis, 
besides the regiments at Van and the eighth marksmen regiment from Erzincan, and 
additional regiments of the Sixth Army were also requested from Revanduz. There were 
                                                 
148 Y. PRK. AZJ... 4/84, August 30, 1881.  
149 Y. PRK. AZJ... 4/96, October 12, 1881. 
150 Y. PRK. UM 5/36 August 21, 1882 The report of the Van governor. 
151 Y. A. Hus 171/37, August 19. 
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already 16 infantry and cavalry regiments in Hakkari.152 In order to neutralize the sheikh’s 
propaganda, the tribal leaders were informed about his escape and how his actions would 
upset the order. The government considered the case very sensitive and acted quickly and 
doggedly. The government ordered the Fourth Army in Erzincan to bring the sheikh back to 
Istanbul alive. An envoy was dispatched with the suggestion that his resistance would lead to 
bloodshed and to tell him that his family would be sent to one of the holy cities of Mecca or 
Medina after him under government care. Royal Secretary Kamil Beğ was dispatched from 
Istanbul to bring him.153 
The group around the sheikh quickly dispersed when they realized that he escaped 
from Istanbul rather than through an official permit. The sheikh moved to his village in Nehri. 
A group of 500 armed men remained under the command of his son Abdulkadir, who tried to 
prevent the arrest of his father. Major Yusuf Paşa was sent to Şemdinan to convey the official 
message, and upon his return he reported that the sheikh was planning to unite tribes to affect 
the Persian tribes, and Iran was also informed so it could take necessary steps at its border. 
The sheikh responded to the official decree that he had gone to Istanbul to demonstrate the 
recent cruelty but had remained in vain, and therefore he had returned to his lodge. Any 
conflict between the soldiers and the people would cause disturbance among Muslims, he 
warned. During his departure from the east the year before, many came until Erzurum to 
prevent his deportation. But he persuaded and prevented them. This time his deportation to 
holy cities also meant the deportation of around 5,000 households. Such measures to make 
things difficult were aimed at inciting him to rebel again, he charged. He had influence among 
200,000 people scattered through Russia, Iran and Ottoman lands. He contended that he had 
                                                 
152 Y. PRK. ASK. 14/7, August 20, Y. PRK.. ASK.., Y. PRK. 14/8. 
153 Y. PRK. BŞK. 6/49, August 22. The official message was entrusted to Yusuf Beğ. 
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only tried to protect his life and honor. He asked for a delay until the spring and then he 
would come to Van, after which he would go wherever he was assigned.154 
At that stage, the government saw the delay as useful in order to make necessary 
military preparations and to better gauge the sheikh’s intentions. The sheikh’s village was 
blockaded, and negotiations with him began. After several days, the sheikh apologized for his 
escape and requested settlement in Mosul when he realized that his condition was critical. 
Meanwhile, the government grew suspicious that he intended to buy time to unite the tribes, 
but such an attempt was doomed to failure by military precautions and the dispersal of the 
initial group around the sheikh. The government had to evaluate the possibility of his fleeing 
to Iran or Russia, which could lead to great trouble. Refuge in Iran was closed to him because 
of previous events. In fact, a Persian governor, Emir Nizam, had already printed a decree 
informing the people about the sheikh’s escape and his rebellion against the Ottoman state. He 
warned the tribes not to join him or believe that any government was supporting him. He also 
claimed that a request by the sheikh for Persian protection had already been denied. There 
were also hints that the sheikh had tried to appeal for Russian protection through the 
arbitration of the Nestorian patriarch, Mar Shamun. The governor of Hakkari reported that 
one of the sheikh’s envoys called Mahmud went to Nestorian villages asking their help, but 
they replied that he should speak about such matters personally with Mar Shamun. Some 
other envoys were also sent to the patriarch, but they returned empty-handed.155 
On September 18, the sheikh met Royal Secretary Kamil Beğ, who had been 
dispatched there in order to arrange his deportation. The sheikh seemed to agree to go to 
Mosul, where he could still enjoy some influence. He requested settlement in Mosul under the 
pretense that he and his family used to live in a cold climate and they would have health 
problems in the heat of the holy cities of Hejaz and furthermore could not bear the long travel. 
                                                 
154 Y. PRK. ASK... 14/20 August 29, the sheikh’s reply. 
155 Y. PRK. ASK... 14/38, the telegram of the Hakkari governor, September 18. The Urmiye governor’s printed 
decree dated September 16 is in the file Y. PRK. ASK. 15/18.  
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The government decided to settle the issue as quickly as possible and offered the sheikh 
25,000 piastre as a travel allowance and a 15,000 piastre salary and if he agreed to go Medina, 
he would get sufficient grain allowances in the city as well.156 The government tried to 
remove the sheikh by moderate means, when there were only 200 men left around him and 
some of the tribes even agreed to help the government in a military operation. Once the sheikh 
was persuaded to go Mosul, from there he could be moved to Medina. But the sheikh strictly 
refused the direct route to Medina.157  
On October 1, Sheikh Abdulkadir attacked Oramar with 300 of his men and took 
control. He began to settle at this easy defensible district and tried to control the surroundings 
from there.158 The sheikh still insisted on settling in Mosul rather than in Medina and 
requested his safety and allowances. He gave an oath to send his son Abdulkadir to Istanbul, 
provided his requests were accepted. The sheikh was completely isolated, and the Ottoman 
state saw his bargaining as a ploy to buy time.  
 Finally, sixty of his family moved to the village of Evliyan on the road to Mosul, but the 
sheikh did not move from Nehri due to illness. When the deadline expired on November 5, 
Ahmed Ratip Beğ stayed in his house to prevent his escape with the assistance of 40 regular 
soldiers and 20 men of the sheikh’s eldest son, Mehmet Sıddık, who had already declared that 
he was ready to serve if his father would not keep his promises.159 His son Abdulkadir 
planned to secret his family out of Evliyan and bring back them to Oramar, but he could not 
leave Oramar due to the military blockade. Sheikh Ubeydullah moved to Evliyan and waited 
for his son, but when he understood that Abdulkadir could not leave Oramar, he decided to 
move to the village of Şepitan.  
                                                 
156 Y. PRK. AZJ. 6/1 Sheikh’s petition, Y. PRK. ASK. 14/39 and 14/40 contain the views of Kamil Beg about 
the sheikh. The government offered 3 erdeb for each month (one erdep was 1,000 kıyye) Y. PRK. BŞK. 7/90, 
September 26.  
157 Nafiz Paşa suggested arresting of sheikh, whereas Kamil Beğ favored a moderate approach. Y. PRK... 7/95. 
158 Y. PRK. ASK... 14/50 and 14/22. 
159 Y. PRK. AZJ... 6/7 Seyh Sıddık’s petition, Y. PRK.. BŞK.. 7/97 Kamil Beğ’s telegram. There was a serious 
conflict between the two sons of the sheikh. Three servants of Mehmed Sıddık were found dead around his 
village. Mehmed Sıddık was able to transfer his family to the Persian side.  
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It was understood that the sheikh would not go Mosul without being arrested. When 
Kamil Paşa was sent to Şepitan with 160 soldiers, another regiment was also dispatched after 
him. At the Gerdi pass the soldiers clashed with a group of around 200 men. The group could 
not stand up to the cannon fire and retreated. Kamil Paşa expected to encounter resistance in 
Şepitan and so asked for the assistance of three regiments. There were already three regiments 
of the Sixth Army at Kanireş, and they moved to Şepitan under the command of Huseyin 
Paşa. Together with thesePaşa forces, Kamil Beğ attacked the village on November 24. 
Sheikh Ubeydullah was taking refuge in one of the houses when the cannon fire began. 
Abdulkadir was two hours from the village with 400 men and tried to help his father. When 
there was no possibility of escape, Sheikh Ubeydullah finally submitted. Even after seven 
hours of clashes, there were no casualties on either side. After two days, Sheikh Abdulkadir 
also came to be near his father in Şirvan. They were sent to Akra and then to Mosul under 
military escort of four regiments.160  
They arrived in Mosul on December 7, and after a month they were sent to Medina via 
Iskenderun. On February 10 they were in Kilis and they arrived in Beirut on March 17, 1882. 
The sheikh died in Medina in autumn of the next year. His son Abdulkadir remained there 
until the 1908 takeover by the Ittihat Terakki Party. He entered the Turkish Parliament as 
deputy from the Hakkari district. Sheikh Mehmed Sıddık had fled to the region early and he 
refrained from harming the order.161 Later he grew very influential in the region.  
 
Conclusion 
 The movement of Sheikh Ubeydullah has been characterized as the first Kurdish nationalist 
uprising. But nationalism required other structures besides mere sheikhdom. There are various 
formulations concerning these structures, including ones such as an economic base, a middle 
                                                 
160 Y. PRK. ASK... 18/39, the report of Major Musa Rüşdi. 
161 March 16, 1902, Y. PRK. ASK, 181/86.  
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class, literacy, diffusion of ideas, etc. In the case of Sheikh Ubeydullah, all of them are 
singularly lacking. 
Yet his movement is still important in dealing with issues concerning the reformation 
problem. It has been claimed that the Ottomans supported his Kurdistan ideal against 
Armenian demands. As I have tried to show here, actually the Ottomans acted in just the 
opposite direction. Secondly, the scope of the movement was not so widespread as claimed, 
though it did have a significant potential to be so. It was essentially a more religious conflict, 
as in this case there was a one-to-one correspondence between the communities involved and 
their associated sects. The sheikh’s movement also tested the illusion of Abdulhamid pan-
Islamism at a relatively early date. 
Abdulhamid had tried to manipulate the other sheikhs in various parts of his shrinking 
empire.162 Ubeydullah sought the arbitration of the Ottoman government in his personal 
problem with Iran, and trusted the sultan’s pan-Islamism in its sincerity. This fact can be 
inferred from letters in which he stressed sultan’s position in leading the order and from his 
pleas to the sultan, who as a caliph was expected to help fellow Muslims. During 
Ubeydullah’s stay in Istanbul, when he recognized that the Iranian and Ottoman empires were 
collaborating against his case and that the latter was willing to forsake the Kurds for its own 
advantage, he became a dissenter and fled. Initially he might have had some plans to increase 
his influence or worries about the situation of Kurds in Iran, but only during the second stage 
did he really try to implement them. When he arrived in Hakkari, he knew well that he could 
not unite the Kurds, although he met with a well of loyalty from some of the tribes in Van, 
mostly former tribes from his Urmiye onslaught. Understanding the prospect of Ottoman 
retaliation, he kept only a little group around himself for an armed retinue, so as not to incite 
                                                 
162 The government increased security around Müfti Mehmed Efendi from Taşlıca after Ubeydullah’s escape, Y. 
PRK. A… 3/46. According to Karpat, “Mehmet Efendi led the Muslims in a guerilla war that, with the help of 
Serbian partisans, for three months prevented the Austro-Hungarian army from occupying the country” (The 
Politicization of Islam, p. 211). 
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the state’s attention.  
The Ottomans still retained some peculiarities of the empire despite the various 
Tanzimat reforms. In the process of transformation, Islamism became the main ingredient of 
nation-building. Meanwhile, the remaining Ottoman lands also needed territorial definition. 
The Ottomans invalidated pan-Islamism for the sake of territorial definition in order to 
confront the Sheikh Ubeydullah movement. This happened relatively early, when the pan-
Islamist policies were still in effect. But no nation can be built using a fake ideology that loses 
its justification and persuasive power at its first hurdle. Some historians who tried to portray 
Abdulhamid as a leading Islamist and his reactionary policies with reformative results, 
through the same concession found pan-Islamism a continuously effective policy throughout 
his reign. Masking them underneath a political religious view obscured the notorious 
outcomes of his reactionary policies.  
When he deported the sheikh, he had other calculations on the settlement of Kurds and 
the reforms. Without proper consideration of Sheikh Ubeydullah’s movement, Hamidian 
regiments cannot be evaluated. Van was a province with a significant Christian population 
because both Nestorians and Armenians lived in the region. It was the only province where 
the Ottomans officially recognized that Christians made up more than half of its population, 
adding both communities together. After lands were ceded in the Russian war, various new 
cities were established by dividing the former provinces of Van and Erzurum. In this way the 
government tried to dissipate its authority over relatively small districts such as Hakkari and 
Bitlis. The influence of local government rivals in these core mountainous regions was also 
weakened by this delay of administrative authority. 
The fact that the government did not lend open support to Ubeydullah can best be described 
by the expression of Sami Paşa in his telegram.163 When he got the order to prevent the 
                                                 
163 Y. PRK. ASK. 5/2, November 22, 1880.  
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sheikh’s onslaught, he was so surprised that he needed to check its meaning, because the form 
of the order expressed that the government would strive with the sheikh. If the Ottomans had 
supported the sheikh, the response of the army commander, who was in the region, would 
have been precise and certain. The sheikh knew well the scope of his Urmiye campaign, and 
at least he expected the Ottomans to pay lip service to that incursion, but the central 
government saw the international condition of the empire differently. 
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